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 Abstract 
Through combined traditional legal and documentary research, in addition to a 
review of current social scientific academic literature on youth perception and behavior, 
this study sought to answer these questions:  
1. What is a student’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a handheld 
internet connected device as defined by the federal circuit and appellate 
courts? 
2. What are students’ expectations of privacy in handheld internet connected 
devices as identified by social science and evidenced in popular culture? 
3. Do these expectations align? 
The federal court cases identified in this research illustrate that courts have yet 
to interpret the application of the Fourth Amendment to student cell phones at schools 
with sufficient depth and uniformity to inform policymakers concerning a consistent, 
universally applicable expectation of privacy for student cell phones. Not only do the 
decisions in these cases give erratic guidance, almost all of them fail to fully 
contemplate the very strong, emotional expectations of privacy that many students 
evidence in their cell phones through social media.  
A lack of clear direction from the courts, the absence of meaningful social 
scientific data, and limited legislative action leave schools and school leaders in the 
position of enacting and enforcing policy relying on information that is ambiguous and 
open to mixed interpretation. This investigation evidences a need for quality social 
science research to inform courts and policymakers about the actual privacy beliefs of 
ix 
modern public-school students and how these beliefs may potentially inform future 
lawmaking and policy development. 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Public schools must exact a delicate balance, preserving individual rights and 
exchange of ideas that are, to many, the greatest hallmarks of our national identity, 
while ensuring institutions are safe from modern society’s greatest threats to students. 
To raise responsible citizens, schools must model respect for the rights of their students 
and an adherence to state and federal laws preserving those rights. All the while, public 
educators must be prepared to respond to minor infractions to the worst forms of human 
violence, yet ensure that these threats do not distract from the obligation to instill in 
children the most cherished values of an ordered society (Susswein, 2000). 
Schools face enormous challenges when it comes to ensuring that the physical 
and digital spaces in which learning takes place are safe and that distractions and 
disruptions from their educational mission are minimized. Drugs, weapons and other 
contraband, various types of rule infractions, even cases of bullying and harassment in 
which students infringe on the rights of their peers are daily struggles for leaders in 
most American schools (Chen, 2017). The advent of new and economical technology 
has helped as schools continue to seek new ways to protect students and schools 
(Schwartz, 2016). Yet, the same technological advances that bring new opportunities to 
enhance instruction and access information have also become a pitfall. More often than 
not, the facts and evidence related to almost all modern security concerns are contained 
on one or many student cell phones (Smith, Mahdavi, Cavalho, Fisher, Russell, & 
Tippett, 2008). 
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Purpose of the Study 
The courts tell us that privacy protections for students in public schools are 
determined by a twofold inquiry. First, did the individual have a legitimate expectation 
of privacy, and is that expectation one that society would recognize as reasonable? This 
potentially creates inherent tension. Between most teenagers and authority figures lies a 
historic chasm – one of mistrust and a feeling of misunderstanding. Beyond the 
stereotypical tension between teens and adults, neurobiological research shows that the 
brains of adolescents are different than those of adults (Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). The 
parts of their brains which deal with executive functions and emotional responses 
actually behave differently (Yergelun-Todd, 2002).  Further distancing the two are their 
perceptions and use of handheld internet connected technologies. To put it bluntly, a 
group of white senior citizens who started their careers by advertising in the phonebook 
are now judicially defining the reasonable privacy expectations of teenagers who have 
never used one. 
While principals and other school leaders are not held to the standards to which 
we hold law enforcement, students also don’t shed their Constitutional rights at the 
schoolhouse gate (Tinker v. Des Moines, 1969). Modern Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence dictates that the threshold question for whether searches and seizures of 
students and belongings are appropriate is whether the individual had a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in what is being searched (TLO, 1985). However, how are we to 
know whether the actual expectations of students align with what courts consider 
reasonable expectations of privacy for the smartphones they bring to school? 
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Through combined traditional legal and documentary research, in addition to a 
review of current social scientific academic literature on youth perception and behavior, 
this proposed study will seek to answer these questions:  
4. What is a student’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a handheld 
internet connected device as defined by the federal circuit and appellate 
courts? 
5. What are students’ expectations of privacy in handheld internet connected 
devices as identified by social science and evidenced in popular culture? 
6. Do these expectations align? 
Privacy: A Modern Construct 
Privacy as we know it is a very modern construct, largely a creation of the 
nineteenth century (Friedman, 2002). It can be difficult to define, and is a murky subject 
at best, but in an increasingly interconnected, digital world where the line between 
public and private spaces are blurred, reasonable expectations of privacy are extremely 
difficult to define-- legally, sociologically, or psychologically. There are even some 
titans of online social media who would question the future of privacy as it was known 
at the close of the 20th Century. In an interview with a Facebook employee, Nick Bilton 
famously asked the employee how Facebook co-founder Mark Zuckerberg feels about 
privacy. “Me: How does Zuck feel about privacy? Response: {laughter} He doesn’t 
believe in it” (Bilton, 2010). 
There is no historical consensus, in philosophy, politics, or law, that privacy is a 
right or value to be protected by law (Negley, 1966), but the concerns that led to the 
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Fourth Amendment were arguably the flame that lit the fire of the American 
Revolution. 
It is clear that the protections offered against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, particularly in one’s home, were among the most important goals of 
United States independence. About the Fourth Amendment, Justice Frankfurter 
wrote, ‘historically we are dealing with a provision of the Constitution which 
sought to guard against an abuse that more than any one single factor gave rise 
to American independence. (Harris v. U.S., 1947) 
The Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 4) 
Origins and Overview 
It could be said that the original intent of the Fourth Amendment was to protect 
against house searches (Steinberg, 2008). Further, the cases and circumstances that led 
our founders to its establishment were exclusively cases that involved political crimes 
and dissent rather than violent crimes (Clancy, 2004). The law that was designed to 
protect entire homes from broad searches by the federal government now protects 
pocket-sized devices with the capacity to carry digital effects far in excess of the 
documentary contents of the average home at the time of the United States Revolution. 
At the time of the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, there was no 
professional police force, and the exclusionary rule, protection against the use of 
illegally obtained evidence in a criminal trial, did not exist (Smith et al., 2008). 
Reasonableness was not the standard used to assess the legality of searches or arrests in 
the framing-era, and there is also no persuasive evidence of such a standard during the 
framing of the state or federal constitutions” (Davies, 1999). “The founding fathers may 
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not have imagined communication systems beyond the Pony Express, but what they did 
foresee was the menace an omnipotent government poses. To curtail this danger, they 
created the Fourth Amendment.” (Navarro, 2003, p. 264). 
For many years, the warrant requirement ensconced in the Fourth Amendment 
served as a tempering agent between the interest of government and the individual. Yet, 
this layer of protection also meant lost time for those investigating various crimes. Strict 
adherence to the warrant requirement was onerous when public safety and other special 
needs were involved. However, in a series of cases, the Supreme Court established 
exceptions to this requirement that shape the way the Fourth Amendment operates in 
public schools (to be reviewed and analyzed in a later chapter), and shed light on the 
future of jurisprudence as we contemplate how schools will manage the increasing 
presence and interference of internet compatible (information communication) 
technologies, or ICTs. “Just like time, technology waits for no one, and the Fourth 
Amendment must once again heed its call.” (Henderson, 2005). 
A much-debated topic among Constitutional scholars is how laws should be 
interpreted. These tend to fall into two camps. Many Constitutional scholars are 
proponents of questioning the framers’ original intent when crafting the language of the 
law. The pragmatic natural law alternative allows for flexible interpretation of the 
Constitution as a living document (Graglia, 1992). As Judge Posner opined, “the 
originalist faces backwards, but steals frequent sideways glances at consequences. The 
pragmatist places the consequence of his decisions in the foreground.” (Graglia, 1992). 
However, handheld internet connected devices, particularly cell phones, present one of 
the greatest quandaries of all time in this regard. The founding fathers had no way to 
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anticipate the privacy concerns of modern America, and the jurists interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment even ten years ago could not have predicted the prevalence of these 
devices in society, nor could they have imagined the storage and connectivity 
capabilities of the devices today. Yet, the Fourth Amendment has never been changed 
from its form as adopted in 1791. 
A Historical Look at Search and Seizure: The Reasonableness Standard 
 In essence, the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect individuals from 
unreasonable government intrusion (Clancy, 2004). The essential questions of what 
interests are protected by the Amendment become, first, who is the government, and, 
second, what is reasonable? 
As early as 1943, the United States Supreme Court included public school 
boards and administrators as government actors and agents (Heder, 1999). Teachers and 
administrators are clearly government actors, even if their interests differ from criminal 
law enforcement. However, not until the decision in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) did the 
Supreme Court apply the protections of the federal law to state actors through the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Rossow, 1995). Thus, the issue of federal protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures in the public school setting did not have its genesis 
until the 1960s. 
Reasonableness is a much debated and constantly evolving construct. 
‘Unreasonable’ is not to be determined with reference to a particular search and 
seizure considered in isolation. The ‘reason’ by which search and seizure is to be 
tested is the ‘reason’ that was written out of historic experience into the Fourth 
Amendment. This means that, with minor and severely confined exceptions, 
inferentially a part of the Amendment, every search and seizure is unreasonable 
when made without a magistrate’s authority expressed through a validly issued 
warrant Harris v. U.S. (1947). However, the types of privacy invasions 
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution were clearly very ‘low tech,’ 
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and could not begin to be directly applied to the types of devices and content 
that exist today. In fact, private conversations were not a protected interest for 
much of the twentieth century and the government could electronically intercept 
such speech without implicating the Fourth Amendment. (Clancy, 2004, p. 
1019) 
Until the decision in Warden v. Hayden in 1967, the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment were chiefly property rights (Clancy, 2004). Privacy rights were limited to 
more or less that which is protected through common law trespass, the physical person 
and concrete effects – one’s home, personal property, papers, etc. However, with the 
emergence of Hayden and, more specifically in Katz v. U.S. (1967) the Court made 
clear that the law’s interest was in protecting people, not places, and that which a person 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected (Clancy, 2004). This changed the view of privacy from a 
governmental standpoint and largely shaped the debate concerning the government’s 
relationship with individuals’ telecommunications and will likely be of huge importance 
as our laws and courts continue to contemplate the societal changes brought about by 
the expanded role of handheld internet connected devices in the United States. 
With the expansion of the Fourth Amendment’s protections to the states in the 
1960s, courts found myriad new factual scenarios needing explanation. In particular, the 
lack of objective criteria to measure reasonableness resulted in the courts’ balancing the 
interests of the government against the rights of the individual citizen. This in turn 
resulted in a steady movement by the courts to expand the permissibility of 
governmental intrusion and the deprecation of individual freedoms (Clancy, 2004).  
This “reasonable expectation of privacy” doctrine, first iterated in Katz v. U.S. 
(1967) casts a lasting shadow and continues throughout modern history of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. “There is a fundamental need for objective criteria to 
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measure the reasonableness of a search or seizure.” (Clancy, 2004, p. 978). The absence 
of such criteria only increases the tension between individual liberty interests and the 
government’s burden of maintaining order.  
There has arisen a hierarchy of protections – first, greater protection is provided 
where citizens have reasonable expectations of privacy that the government is 
prepared to recognize as legitimate, diminished expectations of privacy where 
the courts are more likely to allow government intrusion, and, finally, subjective 
expectations of privacy that society does not recognize as legitimate have no 
protection. (Clancy, 2004, p. 1005) 
Further, the courts’ adherence to this doctrine as if it were in the plain reading of 
the Constitution feeds an argument of circularity. Are the courts protecting rights 
afforded by the Constitution or are they protecting rights created by the Supreme Court? 
The ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test now governs modern Fourth 
Amendment law, and it is up to the courts to determine when an expectation of 
privacy is ‘reasonable.’ As a result, the courts must update and redefine the 
Fourth Amendment as technology evolves, creating and recreating reasonable 
rules that effectively regulate law enforcement and protect privacy in new 
technologies. (Kerr, 2004, p. 805) 
Application of the Fourth Amendment to Warrantless Public School Searches 
While many would argue that New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) was the genesis of 
suspicionless searches and the “special needs” doctrine of exempting certain searches 
from the warrant requirement in the school setting, the door was first opened by the 
United States Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco 
(Camara) (1967). This doctrine essentially justifies search powers without warrants in 
cases where the government’s interest is beyond normal law enforcement, justifying 
administrative searches and inspections, and safety sensitive situations in which the 
government can establish an exigent need.   
Though the Court first authorized a search without a warrant in Weeks v. U.S. 
(1914), Camara marked the first time that a non-criminal investigation was given the 
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power to conduct a warrantless search. In Camara, the Court, for the first time, 
authorized an administrative search without a showing of individualized suspicion 
(Butterfoss, 2007). In the case, which involved code enforcement inspections, 
traditional probable cause could not be established. The court redefined probable cause 
by equating it with “reasonableness” and developed a balancing test between the 
government’s interest and the individual’s expectation of privacy (Butterfoss, 2004). A 
long line of cases followed expanding the list of exemptions to the requirements for 
warrants and individualized specific probable cause. 
For thirty years, the Court upheld virtually every government scheme of 
suspicionless searches and seizures that came before it, belying the Court’s 
description of the category as a ‘closely guarded’ exception to the general rule 
that individualized suspicion is required to undertake a search or seizure. 
(Butterfoss, 2007, pp. 420-21) 
New Jersey v. T.L.O (1985) 
The Supreme Court examined these warrantless searches in the public school 
context in 1985. In TLO (New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985), a student suspected of smoking 
in the bathroom was taken to the principal’s office where school staff demanded to 
search her purse. Whereas the search began as an administrative search to confirm 
suspected student code violations, evidence of illicit drug use and likely distribution 
was discovered. This created a situation where an administrative search turned up 
evidence of criminal activity and caused the school administration to turn the matter 
over to law enforcement.   
The Court held that the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on 
the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the 
reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider 
"whether the . . . action was justified at its inception" (Terry v. Ohio, 1968); second, one 
10 
must determine whether the search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place" (Terry v. 
Ohio, 1968). Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other 
school official will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is 
violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in 
its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the 
search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction. (New Jersey v. TLO, 1985). 
Ultimately, the student faced sanctions from both the school and juvenile justice 
authorities. Notably for schools, TLO shifted the jurisprudence that previously held that 
schools were state actor in loco parentis, or in the surrogate role of the parent. Under 
this approach, schools had essentially every right to regulate students while in school, 
that would otherwise have been granted to the parents. This shift recognized that the 
schools served a governmental or quasi-governmental role with a duty to protect 
students, and must legally act accordingly. In TLO, the Court began to define its 
regulatory search and “special needs” doctrine (exemptions explained later) as it applied 
to schools, exempting some administrative action from the warrant requirement, but 
requiring a “balancing test” between the need to search and the level of invasion 
(Butterfoss, 2007; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985). 
…the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in 
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be 
based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or 
is violating the law. (New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985, p. 742) 
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The Court recognized a need to balance between the schools’ very clear need to 
maintain order and the individual liberty interests of minor students. This was the first 
of line of Supreme Court cases that would strive to achieve this balance, and echoed 
throughout the opinions of each justice. The unanimous Court agreed that the 
government had a strong interest in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on 
school grounds. (Blickenstaff, 2004). They also found that this need for supervision 
justified bypassing the warrant requirement, understanding that requiring teachers and 
administrators to obtain a warrant every time they needed to search a student would 
place an excessive burden on the schools. In essence, the Court held that school-based 
searches fall under the "special needs doctrine," the exception to the Warrant Clause 
that permits searches without a warrant where special needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.  
(Blickenstaff, 2004). 
According to the T.L.O. Court, students in the school setting enjoy a lesser 
expectation of privacy than the average citizen and administrative searches conducted 
by teachers or other school officials must be justified at inception and reasonably 
related to the scope of the circumstances that led to the search in the first place (New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985). Such a search would be justified at inception when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student 
has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school and permissible in 
scope when the measures adopted are reasonable, related to the objectives of the search 
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and nature of the 
infraction (New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985). 
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In essence, T.L.O. established the “special needs” doctrine, excusing not only 
the warrant requirement, but also the strict adherence to the probable cause requirement. 
Further, it soon seemed the Court’s interpretation of “special needs” was basically for 
non-law enforcement purposes. 
Warrantless Searches in the Modern Era 
A new question of privacy came to the Court shortly after New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
(1985). The war on drugs began a new debate about the special needs doctrine. Society 
as a whole began to critically consider the impact that illicit drugs were having on 
families, communities and schools. The purported need for greater regulation and the 
rapid growth of technology soon led school leaders to implement drug testing as a 
deterrent to drug related activity. Soon, courts were called to consider whether 
employers and schools could conduct suspicionless drug tests of employees and 
students. Under T.L.O., it would seem that, if randomized urinalysis is a search, that 
individualized suspicion of a violation of law or policy would be prerequisite to 
administration. As it considered the application of the “special needs” doctrine in the 
case of public schools’ purportedly “non-criminal enforcement” drug testing policies, 
the Supreme Court opined that warrants and probable cause were not only unnecessary 
to establish the reasonableness of the search, individualized suspicion was also not 
required (Vernonia v. Acton, 1995). 
In Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002), the Supreme Court 
considered a public secondary school policy that provided for suspicionless drug testing 
of all students participating in extracurricular activities. It ultimately ruled the policy a 
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reasonable means of furthering the school district’s important interest in preventing and 
deterring drug use among its schoolchildren. 
Likewise, in Safford v. Redding (2009), the Court considered the strip search of 
a student suspected of possessing over-the-counter pain relief medication. While the 
drug was not illegal, student possession was a violation of rules of student conduct. In 
such cases, where a student’s bodily integrity is called into question in a strip search, 
the Court opined they would be Constitutional only if, “the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light 
of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” (Safford v. Redding, 
2009). 
If drug testing was the hotbed issue for search and seizure, internet compatible 
technology and related devices likely pose the next frontier for school related search 
and seizure issues. “While Congress and state legislatures may have a limited role 
regulating government investigations involving new technologies, the real work must be 
done by judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendmen.t” (Kerr, 2004, p.802). 
However, to date, the Supreme Court has never ruled in a case involving a handheld 
internet connected device in the school setting. 
The Supreme Court in the Digital Age: Riley v. California 
The earliest arguments for recognition of privacy protection in law were largely 
related to expanding communication technology such as widely distributed newspapers 
and multiple printed reproductions of photographs. Likewise, Fourth Amendment 
protection against search and seizure was extended later in the twentieth century to 
cover telephone wiretaps and electronic surveillance (Stanford, 2013). These were all 
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concrete items, which could be quantified, with each article inhabiting a physical, albeit 
changeable, location. Not until Katz v. U.S. did the courts in the United States view the 
Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy rather than property (Katz v. U.S., 1967). 
This pivotal case involved a criminal gambling investigation in which the 
defendant was the subject of a warrantless wiretap of a public pay phone. Since there 
was no physical entrance into the area occupied by the defendant, the government 
claimed no Fourth Amendment violation. For the first time, the Supreme Court asserted 
that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places (Katz v. U.S., 1967). 
As important as the holding in the case is Justice Harlan’s concurrence, which 
has now become the bedrock of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In the 
concurrence, he not only states that a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy, but also posits that “there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable” (Katz v. U.S., 
1967). Further, and most aligned to the issues surrounding handheld internet connected 
devices, he stated reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as 
well as physical invasion (Katz v. U.S., 1967). 
The most comprehensive contemplation of this judicial approach in the handheld 
internet connected devices era came in 2015. In Riley v. California (2015), the crux of 
the case involved whether police have the right to search the digital contents of a cell 
phone seized incident to the arrest of its owner. 
The Court considered the unique nature of cell phones, and how the evaluation 
of their search differs so manifestly from the pocket searches incident to arrest that had 
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been considered in previous cases, likening their search to raiding a suspect’s home on 
the basis of their arrest. “They (cell phones) could just as easily be called cameras, 
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, 
televisions, maps, or newspapers.” (Riley v. California, 2015). 
As such, the unanimous Court determined that, “Our answer to the question of 
what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is 
accordingly simple—get a warrant.” (Riley v. California, 2015). However, in his 
concurrence, Justice Alito called for the need for legislatures to elaborate about what 
searches could be permissible in the context of arrest, and questioned the role of the 
Supreme Court in making determination in the absence of legislative directive. 
“Because of the role that these devices have come to play in contemporary life, 
searching their contents implicates very sensitive privacy interests that this Court is 
poorly positioned to understand and evaluate.” (Riley v. California, 2015). 
The Advent of the Handheld Internet Connected Device: An Application the 
Framers Could Never Contemplate 
The handheld internet connected devices has turned traditional Fourth 
Amendment inquiry on its ear. If the constitutional framers had little notion of modern 
privacy, the digital world was surely beyond their comprehension. “Digital assets have 
produced the greatest amount of private individual information the world has ever seen, 
and we are still struggling to determine whether and to what extent the law should 
protect the privacy of these accounts.” (Banta, 2016). 
In the iPhone era, we no longer contemplate the search of simply a locker, a 
book bag, a purse or an address book that each take up their own physical space. These 
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internet connected digital devices, as the Riley Court noted, arguably contain, in digital 
form, address book, photo album, phone pin register, an archive of correspondence, 
bank records, health records, location tracking devices, diaries, calendars, and much, 
much more combined. Furthermore, these devices access not only information stored in 
their device memory, but also information stored on remote servers or “in the cloud,” 
whereby information can potentially be accessed from multiple physical locations by 
electronic means. 
The Digital Divide 
Net Gen in the Age of the iPhone 
The digital divide in terms of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT) use and dependency has been much debated over the past decade. While there is 
some argument about whether a generational divide truly exists, it is becoming clear 
that the question is not whether there is a generational divide in teens and their parents 
use of handheld internet connected devices, but how that divide manifests itself in the 
way these groups use and perceive digital spaces and places. The importance of 
handheld internet connected devices in American society has sparked much discussion 
and research related to privacy in its various forms. 
In 2001, Marc Prensky boldly postulated that the changes of slang, clothes, body 
adornments or styles that had marked the changes between previous generations were 
mere incremental changes compared to the radical changes that marked current 
students. He stated that “today’s students are no longer the people our educational 
system was designed to teach.” (Prensky, 2001, p. 1). 
A really big discontinuity has taken place. One might even call it a “singularity” 
- an event which changes things so fundamentally that there is absolutely no 
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going back. This so-called “singularity” is the arrival and rapid dissemination of 
digital technology in the last decades of the 20th Century. (Prensky, 2001, p. 1) 
This singularity, he said, caused students to think and process information 
fundamentally differently from students in previous generations. He called them 
“Digital Natives,” “native speakers” of the digital language of computers, video games, 
and the Internet. Carrying on this language analogy, he likened that these students took 
to digital technology and internalized it in much the same way one would their native 
tongue. Likewise, he called those not born into this digital world, but adapting to it 
“Digital Immigrants.” These immigrants may learn technology in the way that one may 
learn a new language later in life, but they would likely always carry the accent of their 
first language – or non-digital life – pointing out that language learned later in life is 
information stored in a different area of the brain than first language. 
Just as the worldview and experience of previous generations were shaped by 
the advent of the steam locomotive, electric lighting, the automobile, and the telephone, 
those born into today’s digital landscape experience the interactions and milestones of 
their youth in a way that is technologically very different than the previous generation. 
As John Palfrey and Urs Gasser (2008) said in their book, Born Digital, “unlike those of 
us just a shade older, this new generation didn’t have to relearn anything to live lives of 
digital immersion. They learned in digital the first time around; they only know a world 
that is digital.” (Palfrey, 2008). 
We are still learning and exploring how the technology shifts within the last 15 
years have and will affect different aspects of society. For those born after the 
widespread use of horses and buggies as means of transportation, the daily navigable 
world is a much larger place. Likewise, how will notions of privacy be viewed by 
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individuals who never had phones with cords, or a world without the internet in the 
palm of their hand? “People who have never known a world without smartphones and 
social media likely have a very different sense of individuality than their ancestors who 
lived on the farm or frontier.” (Fogel, 2014). 
Problem 
Given that the Supreme Court has never weighed in on a case involving cell 
phones in a public school, and the rapid growth and change in these technologies, 
schools are in a constant scramble to stay ahead of their implicated security concerns 
and relatedly, student discipline issues. There is no clear directive as to how to frame 
policies to adequately protect student rights, nor to ensure that the federal courts’ 
interpretations represent the actual expectations of students. These gaps in knowledge 
present an important area for inquiry and the problem this dissertation will address 
through methods aimed at establishing a baseline of what the federal circuit and 
appellate courts deem reasonable, as well as to identify popularly held actual student 
expectations of privacy with cell phones at public schools. 
Analytical Methods and Data 
 This study will undertake traditional legal methods to establish a baseline of 
what the courts consider a reasonable expectation of privacy for students possessing cell 
phones at public schools. This will involve explorations into primary sources of law at 
the case level in both state and federal courts, as well as secondary sources including 
journal and law review articles. This study will be limited to an examination of cases 
involving the search of a student possessed internet connected device in which Fourth 
Amendment protections have been invoked. 
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I will compare and contrast this current baseline expectation within the law with 
an empirical social science literature and additional forms of popular culture as 
expressed in broader journalistic and public readership materials. The legal analyses and 
related findings will be weighed against current knowledge in social science about 
contemporary youth perceptions and dispositions, as well as portrayals of related issues 
in popular culture, whether it be movies, magazines, blogs, or other texts.  
The overarching design of the study will include a search of all state and federal 
cases in which a Fourth Amendment claim is made related to a student cell phone 
against public school actors in the pre-kindergarten through 12th grade context through 
Lexis Nexis. These cases will be analyzed to isolate court findings or assertions related 
to what expectation of privacy a student may consider reasonable. These statements will 
be considered based on whether they are a state or federal case and through any appeal, 
if applicable. This data will be organized and manipulated to identify any trends that 
may be revealed based on court type, date, contextual issues 
Parallel to this inquiry, qualitative media content analysis of internet published 
news and magazine stories and public commentary in response to these stories, as well 
as public social media forums, and movies from 2006 to 2018 will be examined to 
describe substance characteristics of message content; determine whether any 
declarations or assumptions about student held or generally accepted expectations of 
privacy in cell phones may be identified. Published, peer-reviewed social science 
studies from the same time period will be examined to identify findings related to 
minors and conceptions of privacy related to cell phones as devices and their content.  
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Findings from case law will be compared and contrasted with the data from 
social science and media to determine whether current jurisprudentially-established 
expectations are in harmony with actual expectations of privacy for students with cell 
phones at public schools. 
These analytical methods will be directed toward answering the three questions 
posed in the study: 
1. What is a student’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a handheld 
internet connected device as defined by the federal circuit and appellate 
courts? 
2. What are students’ expectations of privacy in handheld internet connected 
devices, from student and adult perspectives, as identified by social science 
and evidenced in popular culture? 
3. Do these expectations align? 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter 1 has provided the purpose of this study and its related problem, 
providing a summary of the important legal and social science issues incumbent in a 
thoroughgoing legal examination of the current condition of public schools and the 
children who attend them.  
Chapter 2 will provide a more in-depth look at the origins and overview of the 
Fourth Amendment. This will include a historical understanding of search and seizure 
in America, as well as an overview of major search and seizure opinions issued by the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s most thorough examination of cell phone 
technologies will be addressed. 
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In Chapter 3, this work will explore the digital divide. Its content will provide an 
understanding of what is known as the Net Generation, and will address the application 
of this and similar distinctions to social science in terms of conceptions of privacy. 
 The application of the law to schools will be explained in Chapter 4. This will 
include a historical foundation of the application of the Fourth Amendment to public 
schools, the reasonableness standard, and warrantless searches in the public school 
context. Central to this chapter will be an examination of the landmark case of New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985).  
 The design and conduct of this study with respect to the collection and analyses 
of pertinent social scientific research and popular culture as expressed in journalistic 
texts and related communication modalities is presented in Chapter 5. The procedures 
and analytical approach to these texts will be explained in light of the preceding 
chapters that provide for an in-depth coverage of germane legal issues. These will begin 
with broad keyword searches from the databases of Google and LexisNexis and will be 
refined as necessary to draw keywords in context to extract statements that can be 
inferred through qualitative ethnographic media content analysis to establish meaning 
for what the United States public outside of the legal profession considers privacy as it 
relates to student handheld internet connected devices in the public school setting. 
 Chapter 6 will present the findings of the research. This will include an index of 
cases addressing expectations of privacy for students possessing cell phones at public 
schools from 2006 to 2017. For each, statements establishing what the courts assert is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in student possessed handheld internet connected 
devices in public school settings will be identified. If the cases have been appealed, 
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subsequent treatment of the issue will be tracked to determine if the courts’ recognition 
of student rights are consistent throughout the appellate process. A sampling of excerpts 
from news media, social media, and popular culture depictions and a categorized 
synthetic review of what current social science research tells us about youth culture will 
also be presented.  
A summary of findings, as well as conclusions and recommendations for 
practice will be presented in Chapter 7. This will include the significance of the study, 
implications of its findings, and recommendations for those serving in leadership roles 
in public schools. The chapter will provide suggested topics for further research before 












Chapter 2: Origins and Overview of the Fourth Amendment 
The true history of the Fourth Amendment requires an examination of centuries’ 
worth of the English and American experience. The first documentary bases of what we 
know as the Fourth Amendment go back as far as the Magna Carta. Perhaps no tenet of 
the common law is more well-known than the belief that a man’s home is his castle. 
The initial codification of broad search and seizure powers in England went 
hand in hand with the introduction of the printing press, and the early use of those 
powers was largely used to restrain the distribution of seditious material (Landynski, 
1966). It could be said that the earliest injustices against which the Fourth Amendment 
was designed to protect went hand in hand with the speech and press protections later 
embodied in the First Amendment. These powers, which had been used sporadically 
throughout history, were codified and enforced in England with fervor by Tudors, and 
grew over the following 150 years. 
Initially, the restraints forced printers into compliance with censorship laws in 
order to gain mandatory state licensing. In this scheme, private guilds were given search 
and seizure rights to enforce laws against sedition. This separated the English 
government from enforcement and supported private monopolies in printing. Parliament 
passed a law in 1662 granting the power to issue warrants, from specific to general, and 
writs of assistance which allowed the holder to appoint any citizens they deemed 
necessary to assist them in the task. One, for example, granted the Surveyor of the Press 
the right to “seize all seditious books and libels and to apprehend the authors, 
contrivers, printers, publishers and dispersers of them,” and to “search any house, shop, 
printing room, chamber, warehouse, etc. for seditious, scandalous or unlicensed 
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pictures, books, papers…” (Landynski, 1966, pg. 24).  These general warrants and writs 
of assistance gave officials broad, almost carte blanche, powers to search at will without 
requiring them to establish the basis for suspicion, unrestricted as to time, place, or 
manner. In 1696 Parliament granted the authority for officials to apply for writs of 
assistance in the American colonies. 
In the reign of James I, these powers expanded into something known as the writ 
of assistance. These general warrants for the search and seizure of purportedly 
smuggled goods, gave all officers of the Crown authority to assist in the execution of 
the searches, seizures, and enforcements. The first time that Parliament recognized that 
general warrants were an arbitrary exercise of government against which the public had 
a right to be protected was in 1685, when Parliament impeached a chief justice for 
misdeeds including his issuance of general warrants (Landynski, 1966).  
In colonial America through the framing of the Constitution, there was no 
professional law enforcement as we know it. Those charged with the task were often 
unpaid, rotating laymen. Those executing general warrants and writs of assistance were 
not trained officers of the law, and not necessarily impartial in any way, therefore, the 
citizenry preferred searches be conducted upon specific warrants authorized by 
magistrates upon some showing of cause for their issuance. Colonists held much greater 
trust in magistrates issuing specific warrants rather than untrained and unsophisticated 
individuals acting on general warrants (Davies, 1999). 
Further, citizens could resist what they believed to be unlawful searches, 
seizures or arrests, with the right to civil damages for trespass in the case of illegal 
searches and seizures. Rather than the information or belief held by the searcher, what 
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we might now call probable cause, these cases rested on whether the individual was 
actually convicted of the crime (Davies, 1999). 
Whereas the earliest complaints about infringements of what we would now 
consider Fourth Amendment rights centered around searches for seditious materials, in 
colonial America these complaints centered around searches for smuggled goods and 
concealment of items to avoid revenue payments to the Crown (Davies, 1999). When 
misused, these warrants and writs could be used to damage business rivals, those with 
whom individuals had disputes, and those who may have political leanings that were 
disfavorable to the Crown. While warrantless searches and seizures were not 
uncommon in the case of individuals who may have committed acts of violence and the 
like, the historical record of prerevolutionary grievances shows no complaint about 
searches and seizures beyond those authorized by general warrants and writs of 
assistance (Davies, 1999). In general, the record suggests that the framers of the 
Constitution supported the processes associated with specific warrants (Davies, 1999). 
“Reasonableness” was not the standard upon which searches or arrests were 
based during the framing era. Framers’ search and seizure complaints tend to center 
around the application of general warrants to support house searches.” (Davies, 1999). 
 The legality of writs of assistance were questioned in what history would come 
to know as the Writs of Assistance Case or Paxton’s Case. When called upon by Boston 
merchants to defend the legality of general warrants, Advocate General James Otis 
promptly resigned and took up the role of counsel for the merchants. In his five-hour 
argument, Otis stated, “It appears to me the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the 
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most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was 
found in an English law-book.” (Constitution.org). 
Among those inspired in the audience that day was John Adams. In fact, aside 
from the preamble of Otis’ speech, the contents of the oratory remain in history only in 
the Adams’ summary. His description of the content includes in its passages phrases 
such as, “he asserted that these rights were inherent and inalienable,” and, “he asserted 
that the security of these rights to life, liberty, and property had been the object of all 
those struggles against arbitrary power, temporal and spiritual, civil and political, 
military and ecclesiastical, in every age. He asserted that our ancestors, as British 
subjects, and we their descendants, as British subjects, were entitled to all those rights 
by the British constitution as well as by the law of nature and our provincial character as 
much as any inhabitant of London or Bristol or any part of England, and were not to be 
cheated out of them by any phantom of "virtual representation" or any other fiction of 
law or politics or any monkish trick of deceit and hypocrisy.” (Constitution.org). 
When the writ was ultimately upheld, the spark grew into the flames of 
revolution, and Otis’ influence on John Adams would be evidenced by both the 
Declaration of Independence and the Fourth Amendment. 
Alone among those constitutional provisions which set standards of fair conduct 
for the apprehension and trial of accused persons, the Fourth Amendment 
provides us with a rich historical background rooted in American, as well as 
English, Experience; it is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that 
grew directly out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary 
struggle with England. (Landynski, 1966, p. 19) 
Throughout the drafting of the Constitution, and after its ratification in 1788, 
many argued that the document did not go far enough in protecting individual liberties. 
Almost immediately upon, if not before ratification, amendments were proposed to 
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avoid a second Constitutional Convention. During this time, nine different states 
enacted their own charters of individual rights including components reflecting what 
would be protected by the ultimate adoption of the Fourth Amendment. Of the state 
provisions enacted prior to the ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 1791, the idea 
of “reasonableness” was not incorporated until the seventh of nine different state 
versions of what would become the basis of the Fourth Amendment (Davies, 1999). 
Therefore, in 1789, leaning heavily on a range of documents from the Magna 
Carta, to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and even Adams’ recounting of Writs of 
Assistance Case, Congress approved 12 amendments to the Constitution. The first 10 of 
these became known as the Bill of Rights. The fourth of these states:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. (U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV) 
The Amendment can be viewed as two separate clauses. First, individuals are 
protected against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Secondly, warrants must be 
issued based on probable cause and must be specific in what is to be searched and 
seized. 
The structure of the Fourth Amendment has been much debated from a historical 
standpoint. There are those who would argue that it mandates that all searches and 
seizures must be predicated by a warrant. Any deviation from this must be an exception 
clearly stated in law. This is often referred to as a warrant preference.  
On the other It has been argued that the Framers had little concern about the 
kinds of warrantless searches that were routinely conducted. Those on this side of the 
argument hold that the Framers’ opposition was to general warrants and wanted to 
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ensure that any warrants issued be done so with particularity. Rather than assuming that 
the choice of the word “unreasonable” was designed to protect against warrantless 
searches, those in this camp tend to argue that, when drafting the Fourth Amendment, 
John Adams used the word “unreasonable” to avoid potential misinterpretation of 
language such as that in the Pennsylvania provision which could be construed to ban all 
searches and seizures in houses (Davies, 1999).  
The content of the Amendment on its face is one consideration, the other is how 
two and a half centuries of judicial interpretation have changed the character of the 
protections. Framers assumed common law would continue, but our jurisprudential 
history has proved them wrong.  
The idea of a constitution implies permanence and continuity. Even though there 
is little consensus as to precisely how or how much the intended meaning of a 
constitutional text should matter in contemporary constitutional analysis, there is 
a widely shared sense that the Framers’ meaning should carry some weight, or 
matter in some way. Thus, discussion of the historical meaning of a 
constitutional provision almost inevitably leads to consideration of its 
implications for modern doctrinal issues. (Davies, 1999, p. 734) 
In some ways, thoughts of the origins of the Fourth Amendment and how they 
were applied in the earliest days of the United States are very foreign. This is both a 
reflection of how the country has changed over the last two centuries and how the 
application of the Fourth Amendment has evolved through the courts and modern 
theories of policing. This story is complex, and must be considered in the context of 
much broader and institutional and doctrinal transformations shaping modern American 
Constitutional law (Davies, 1999). 
 Few federal cases dealt with the Fourth Amendment in the 19th Century. Those 
that did tended to center around the application of legislation authorizing novel uses of 
warrants. These were evaluated not based on reasonableness standards, but on whether 
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the warrants were authorized under the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, state courts were 
similarly silent on issues of reasonableness (Davies, 1999). With the dawn of 
Prohibition with the adoption of the 18th Amendment in 1919, came a new need for the 
courts to grapple with the Fourth Amendment (Landynski, 1966). 
Warrantless searches actually took place in the United States for over 100 years 
before they were specifically authorized by law. Typically, these searches took place in 
spheres of law enforcement dealing with such wrongdoing that the general public had 
no complaint with them. Congress did not specifically authorize warrantless arrests until 
1935, subject to reasonable grounds that the person has committed or is committing a 
federal felony. 
The following is a timeline summary of the major cases and holdings of the 
Supreme Court related to the Fourth Amendment: 
1868: The 14th Amendment was ratified, stating, in part,  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 
Amend. XIV)  
1886: The production of potentially incriminating papers requires the same 
warrant authority as if the government searched for them (Boyd v. U.S., 1886).  
1914: Evidence gathered illegally cannot be used against a criminal defendant. 
Often referred to as the exclusionary rule (Weeks v. U.S., 1914). This case notably failed 
to recognize the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
1925:  The Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement for 
roadside searches of a vehicle whereas the officer has probable cause that either 
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evidence will be destroyed or “lost” if the vehicle leaves the scene (Carroll v. U.S., 
1925).  
1928: Viewing the Fourth Amendment from a property/trespass perspective, the 
Court upheld the validity of evidence obtained by a wiretap where officers did not 
physically trespass onto any private property (Olmstead v. U.S., 1928).  
1942: A wiretap was not considered a violation when no trespass was occurring 
at the time the message was intercepted- even though officers trespassed in order to 
plant the device (Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 1942). 
1949: The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause did not prohibit the 
admission of illegally obtained evidence in state court (once again, failing to 
incorporate the protections of the Fourth Amendment through the 14th Amendment) 
(Wolf v. Colorado, 1949).  
1952: When a wired informant is willingly invited onto private property by the 
defendant, or person of interest, no trespass has occurred and any information gathered 
is admissible in court (On Lee v. U.S.,1952).  
1961: Recognizing the application of the Fourth Amendment to the States as 
incorporated by the 14th Amendment, the Court establishes for the first time that all 
evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures is inadmissible into court, at 
both the federal and state levels (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961). 
1967: Katz v. U.S. (see below). 
1968: The Court authorized what is known in law enforcement as the “stop and 
frisk.” In doing so, the court noted the prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect on the street and frisks him 
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or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime 
and has a reasonable belief that the person may be armed and presently dangerous. 
(Terry v. Ohio, 1968). 
1969: A warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest may justified in the 
interest of officer safety or in order to preserve evidence. This warrantless search is only 
valid when “the arrestee is unsecured and is in reaching distance from the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search” (Chimel v. California, 1969).  
1970: The warrantless search of a vehicle that had been moved from the original 
location of the traffic stop to a police station does not violate the Fourth Amendment if 
there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains criminal evidence and there 
existed exigent circumstances where the vehicle could be removed from the jurisdiction 
(Chambers v. Maroney, 1970). 
1971: The warrantless search of an arrestee’s vehicle parked in his driveway is 
not a legitimate application of the search incident to arrest. “Searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-defined exceptions” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 1971).  
1973: A full search of a person conducted during lawful arrest is reasonable 
under the 4th Amendment (U.S. v. Robinson, 1973).  
1978: Passengers in a car of which they did not own had no "legitimate 
expectation of privacy.”  The rights afforded by the Fourth Amendment are personal 
and cannot be claimed vicariously (U.S. v. Leon (1984). 
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1983: Probable cause may be established based on the totality of the 
circumstances, and not solely on the veracity or reliability of all sources of knowledge, 
to establish a substantial basis that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing in 
order to gain a warrant (Illinois v. Gates, 1983). 
1984: Evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued based on mistaken 
information was permissible because of a "good faith" exception. The exclusionary rule 
is not a right but a remedy to deter illegal police conduct (Nix v. Williams, 1984). 
1984: It is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to plant a homing device 
into a container of materials to be used for an illegal narcotics operation in order to 
track its movement, as it does not interfere with an individual’s property interest in the 
item. However, monitoring such a warrantless surveillance device within the home 
would likely be viewed as a violation (U.S. v. Karo, 1984).  
1985: A motor home on a public roadway qualifies it as a vehicle subject to 
warrantless searches. However, if a motor home is not on public roadways, a warrant is 
required to search the vehicle because it is then considered a house (California v. 
Carney, 1985).  
1985: Warrantless searches may be conducted by school officials in the public 
school setting when there is reasonable suspicion of an infraction, the search is justified 
at its inception and the scope of the search is reasonable and not excessively intrusive 
given the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction (New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 1985). See detailed discussion in Chapter Four. 
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1986: The Fourth Amendment is not violated if a search warrant is issued based 
on, or evidence is gathered through, the use of naked-eye aerial observation (California 
v. Ciraolo, 1986).  
1988: A resident does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage or 
trash left outside of the curtilage of a home. It is considered abandoned by the 
inhabitants of the private residence and therefore, searchable without a warrant 
(California v. Greenwood, 1988).  
1995: Given the diminished privacy expectations of student athletes, school 
districts’ compelling interest in deterring drug use is sufficient to warrant random drug 
testing of student athletes (Vernonia v. Acton, 1995). 
1999: A warrantless search of a passenger’s personal belongings does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment if a law enforcement official has probable cause to 
conduct a warrantless vehicle search (Wyoming v. Houghton, 1999). 
2001: Use of aerial thermal imaging to detect likely marijuana growing 
operations was unconstitutional because the “information from the thermal imaging was 
the product of a search” and a search warrant was not obtained by the officials before 
conducting the search (Kyllo v. U. S., 2001). 
2001: A policy requiring the random urinalysis of all students participating in 
co-curricular activities did not violate the Fourth Amendment (Bd. of Educ. of Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 2001). 
2006: Warrantless searches can be conducted to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence. However, police cannot create the exigency through engaging 
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or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment (Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 2006). 
2009: A warrantless vehicle search is legal if it is “reasonable to believe that 
evidence related to the crime and/or arrest might be found in the vehicle,” and that the 
arrestee will have access to the compartments in the vehicle (Arizona v. Gant, 2009).  
2009: Strip searching a public school student to find over the counter analgesic 
medication was excessive in scope and overly intrusive given the circumstances and 
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation (Safford v. Redding, 2009). 
2012: Installation of a global positioning device on a vehicle in order to track its 
movements constitutes a search, and evidence obtained in exceeding the scope of a 
search warrant for this purpose is inadmissible (U.S. v. Jones, 2012).  
2013: Swabbing an arrestee’s mouth for DNA analysis is not a constitutional 
violation when arrest was for a serious crime, and the DNA analysis did not disclose 
genetic or medical information, and no record was compiled in a database (Maryland v. 
King, 2013). 
2013: Use of a police dog sniff in a constitutionally protected area like the 
curtilage of a home is unconstitutional without a warrant (Florida v. Jardines, 2013). 
2014: Accessing the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest requires 
a warrant (Riley v. California, 2014). (see below). 
Pending: Does the Fourth Amendment allow evidence of geolocation obtained 
without a warrant through third party cell phone providers to be used against a 
defendant in a criminal case (Carpenter v. U.S., 2017)? 
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Katz v. United States 
Until the decision in Warden v. Hayden in 1967, the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment were chiefly property rights (Clancy, 2004). Privacy rights were limited to 
more or less that which is protected through common law trespass, the physical person 
and concrete effects – one’s home, personal property, papers, etc. However, with the 
emergence of Hayden and, more specifically in Katz v. U.S. (1967) the Court made 
clear that the law’s interest was in protecting people, not places, and that which a person 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected (Clancy, 2004).  
In the case, Katz was convicted of a federal crime related to use of a telephone 
for illegal interstate gambling. The evidence upon which he was convicted consisted of 
telephone conversations obtained by FBI agents who, without a warrant, placed an 
electronic listening device outside a public telephone booth where they suspected Katz 
conducted his illegal operation. While the appeals court rejected the contention that the 
recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because “there was 
no physical entrance into the area occupied” by the suspect, the Supreme Court, noted 
that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places, and “cannot turn upon the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.” (Katz v. U.S., 
1967, at 353). This changed the view of privacy from a governmental standpoint and 
largely shaped the debate concerning the government’s relationship with individuals’ 
telecommunications—noting the vital role that the public telephone had come to play in 
private communication. Likewise, this interpretation may be essential as our laws and 
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courts continue to contemplate the societal changes brought about by the expanded role 
of handheld internet connected devices in the United States. 
In essence, Katz shifted the question of whether there had been a physical 
intrusion of a constitutionally protected space to Court repeatedly stating that the Fourth 
Amendment’s principal concern is the protection of privacy (Clancy, 2014).  Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz established a two-part test of whether the search is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment that carries on through the jurisprudence of today. 
First, did the individual have a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental 
intrusion in the invaded place? Justice Harlan famously noted that this subjective 
expectation has much diminished as a viable standard because “our expectations and the 
risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs 
and values of the past and present (U.S. v. White, 1971).” The second prong is the 
question of whether society finds that expectation of privacy as legitimate. The court 
later explained “legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source 
outside the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal 
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” (Rakas 
v. Illinois, 1978). 
With the expansion of the Fourth Amendment’s protections to the states in the 
1960s, courts found myriad new factual scenarios needing explanation. In particular, the 
lack of objective criteria to measure reasonableness resulted in the courts’ balancing the 
interests of the government against the rights of the individual citizen. This in turn 
resulted in a steady movement by the courts to expand the permissibility of 
governmental intrusion and the deprecation of individual freedoms (Clancy, 2004).  
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This “reasonable expectation of privacy” doctrine, first iterated in Katz v. U.S. 
(1967) casts a lasting shadow and continues throughout modern history of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. “There is a fundamental need for objective criteria to 
measure the reasonableness of a search or seizure” (Clancy, 2004, p. 978). The absence 
of such criteria only increases the tension between individual liberty interests and the 
government’s burden of maintaining order.  
There has arisen a hierarchy of protections – first, greater protection is provided 
where citizens have reasonable expectations of privacy that the government is 
prepared to recognize as legitimate, diminished expectations of privacy where 
the courts are more likely to allow government intrusion, and, finally, subjective 
expectations of privacy that society does not recognize as legitimate have no 
protection. (Clancy, 2004, p. 1005) 
Further, the courts’ adherence to this doctrine as if it were in the plain reading of 
the Constitution feeds an argument of circularity. Are the courts protecting rights 
afforded by the Constitution or are they protecting rights created by the Supreme Court? 
Riley v. California 
In February of 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
ruled that the search of a cell phone upon arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
(U.S. v. Flores-Lopez, 2012). In its reasoning, the court likened the cell phone to any 
other container of information, whether that be a cigarette case or an address book. The 
cell phone and its electronic contents were treated like any other tangible item that 
might be found upon a person. The first real treatment of cell phones in the Supreme 
Court, as well as the first major case to recognize the modern scope of digital 
information they can access and or contain, came in 2014 with Riley v. California. The 
decision represented two separate cases on appeal. In both, the individuals had been 
arrested. As part of law enforcement searches incident to their arrest, defendants’ cell 
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phones (one of which was a flip phone) were seized. Officers then, without warrant, 
accessed information on the phones that either evidenced their involvement in a crime 
or led to the discovery of incriminating evidence. 
The decision was narrow, focusing on warrantless searches incident to arrest. 
For those interested in how the decision could affect Fourth Amendment considerations 
in the school setting there were few answers. Further, while the case represented the 
Court’s first real consideration of Fourth Amendment protections in a world where such 
a dearth of data is carried in a person’s pocket, it may have created as many questions as 
it answered. Justice Alito’s concurrence noted that these considerations ran the risk of 
protecting digital information that would not have been protected in a more traditional 
physical form. 
Further, he questioned the Court’s role in evaluating the privacy interests 
involved in this kind of technology, suggesting that legislatures are better positioned to 
respond to changes, presumably in both technology and privacy considerations, than 
courts. 
(b)ecause of the role that these devices have come to play in contemporary life, 
searching their contents implicates very sensitive privacy interests that this 
Court is poorly positioned to understand and evaluate. Many forms of modern 
technology are making it easier and easier for both government and private 
entities to amass a wealth of information about the lives of ordinary Americans, 
and at the same time, many ordinary Americans are choosing to make public 
much information that was seldom revealed to outsiders just a few decades ago. 
(Riley v. California, 2014)  
Carpenter v. United States 
Now before the Court is the second major case to involve mobile phones. Four 
men were arrested in connection with a series of armed robberies in California. Upon 
confessing, one of the four turned over his cell phone and the cell phone numbers of the 
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three other arrestees to the FBI. This information was used to juridically gain access to 
transactional records from third parties –specifically cell phone carriers – to obtain the 
date, time, and parties to calls, as well as cell tower location data of the approximate 
location of the device at the beginning and ending of each call. Carpenter was 
criminally charged based on information obtained in these call records. 
The question to be addressed is whether the warrantless search and or seizure of 
cell phone records including the location and movements of their users violate the 
Fourth Amendment. The case was argued November 29, 2017, and is pending at the 









Chapter 3: The Digital Divide and Privacy 
Digital Natives and the Digital Divide 
There are many arguments about what might constitute a “digital divide.”  Some 
may refer to divides in access to technology or broadband internet. Others may refer to 
access divides related to an individual’s country of citizenship, their race or gender, or 
those influenced by socio-economics, etc. In this research, any reference to a digital 
divide refers to a generational divide between those who have acquired internet 
connected technology as it has been introduced in their lifetime and those who were 
born at such a time as to develop the language and literacy of these technology 
synchronous to their acquisition of more traditional forms of language and literacy. 
While analogizing these groups to digital natives and digital immigrants, 
Prensky (2001b) also likened the generational divide to social psychological phenomena 
in which people who grow up in different cultures do not only think about different 
things, they actually think differently. He (2001a) called for educators to confront the 
issues and challenges related to teaching this new breed of student, reconsidering both 
content and methodology. What began as a call to a crisis in education quickly became 
one of the biggest issues in American cultural discourse. In the early days of the internet 
there was a great deal of discussion about a digital divide- one which would separate 
those who did and did not have access to internet and then high-speed internet and what 
they could offer and those who could not. Quickly, the divide between digital natives 
and digital immigrants became a second digital divide. The characterization of these 
entities as polar rather than points on a continuum fueled the debate.  
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Later works sought to debunk Prensky (2001). In his 2009 piece, The Digital 
Native- myth and reality, Neil Selwyn suggested we reconsider the notions of “digital 
natives” and the “net generation” in light of young people’s actual use of digital 
technology and information. 
The “commonsensical” notion of the digital native is fore-grounded increasingly 
in the thoughts and pronouncements of policymakers, technology vendors and 
opinion formers throughout the world. Yet whilst the idea of young people being 
notably different from previous generations in their technical aptitudes and 
abilities may well have a strong intuitive appeal, the ease with which these 
commonsensical “stories” of the digital native generation are being repeated and 
being “re-told” should be cause for some alarm. (Selwyn, 2009, p. 366) 
Selwyn (2009) argued that many depictions of digital natives in literature “imply 
a profound disempowerment of older generations” (p. 369), and tend toward 
exaggeration and inconsistency. He was critical of much literature on the digital divide 
as relying on a so-called evidence base rooted in informal observation and anecdote, 
adopting a legalistic rather than social scientific notion of evidence in terms of helping 
establish a particular case or point of view regardless of contradictory findings. He 
argued that the debate needs to advance from “the perpetuation of ‘common sense’ 
assumptions that tend to inform public discourse about children and technology, and 
move beyond the theoretically weakened set of essentialist assumptions about children 
and technology that inform the current digital native commentary” (p.371). 
He was not alone in his argument. Research showed vast differences between 
young and old that used the internet and those who did not, and exposed huge access 
issues across many demographic groups (Zickuhr & Smith, 2012). However, while 
demographics played a large role in these discrepancies in 2000, many have now 
significantly narrowed. Once again, we must question whether non-age demographic 
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divisions really have a role in the differences between digital natives and their 
immigrant counterparts. 
 The internet access gap closest to disappearing is that between whites and 
minorities. Differences in access persist, especially in terms of adults who have 
high-speed broadband at home, but they have become significantly less 
prominent over the year[s] and have disappeared entirely when other 
demographic factors (including language proficiency) are controlled for. 
(Zickurh & Smith, 2012 p. 6)  
When the Pew Research Center began tracking tablet ownership in 2010, only 
3% of Americans owned one. As of its most recent published data, the center reports 
that figure rose to over 51% in November 2016 (Pew, 2016). Roughly 77% of 
Americans own smartphones—a number that more than doubled over a mere five years, 
and among young adults that number has surged to 92% (Pew, 2016). There is also 
evidence that handheld internet connected devices may be leveling the playing field 
where other types of divides may have previously existed. “Groups that have 
traditionally been on the other side of the digital divide in basic internet access are using 
wireless connections to go online” (Zickurh & Smith, 2012). 
David S. White and Alison Le Cornu (2011) revisited Prensky’s (2001) 
Natives/Immigrants typology, proposing the continuum of “visitors” and “residents” in 
their place. They joined the critique that questioned whether older learners are really as 
“handicapped” as Prensky seems to assume or that younger learners are as privileged as 
assumed. Specifically, they questioned whether there may be as much variation within 
generations as between them in that, just as almost every other subject area of discipline 
and content mastery, some individuals will inherently acquire skills at a much different 
rate than others, regardless of their age group.  
White and Le Cornu (2011) sought to demonstrate that Prensky (2001) was,  
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over hasty in appropriating an analogy which cannot bear the weight required of 
it…imprecise in his combination of diverse elements (second-language learning, 
accent, habit and age, linking all these to brain development) which cannot be 
legitimately combined to make his case. (p. 7)  
White and Le Cornu (2011) saw Internet users in a broader sense, but also drew 
their terms from the idea of the digital world as a place. Visitors are essentially users 
rather than members of the web who use the web as a “tool” and not as a “place,” and 
residents are those who see the web as a place where a proportion of their lives are lived 
and who do not make a clear distinction between concepts of content and of persona, 
were designed to be seen as a continuum and not in binary opposition (White & Le 
Cornu, 2011). They asserted that, in different contexts, individuals’ place along this 
continuum is likely to shift. 
These post-Prensky (2001) authors all focused on perhaps the wrong group. It 
has been suggested that, in all likelihood, Prensky wasn’t wrong, he was just writing ten 
years ahead of his time (Waters, 2011). The students considered by Selwyn (2009), 
White & Le Cornu (2011) and others may not have been the true net-gen. Julie Evans, 
chief executive officer of Project Tomorrow, made the case in 2011 (Waters, 2011), 
“even though we’ve been talking about digital natives for 10 years, the first wave of 
true digital natives – kids who have been connected to the internet in school since 
kindergarten – are just now in middle school.” The groups now in high school and 
college likely did not have internet in their classrooms when they began school and may 
not have taken an online test until middle school. Some would argue that we are only 
now seeing the emergence of the true net-gen. 
Consider that Facebook was founded in 2004, and until 2006 was only primarily 
available to students and limited groups with email addresses ending in .edu, .gov or 
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.mil (Facebook, 2012). The iPhone – arguably the most important technology 
innovation of the century thus far – has been on the market around 10 years. Given the 
impact this single ICT device has had on society, it is almost unimaginable to 
contemplate the issues we will be discussing 10 years from now. However, privacy, in 
its many forms, will almost certainly remain central to the discourse. 
Conceptions of Privacy 
Privacy is clearly difficult to define. However, like liberty and justice, this does 
not undermine its importance (Moore, 2008). Some semblance of what might 
commonly be called privacy is tied to one’s rights and identity as they relate to their 
country, their home and most intimate aspects of life, and in some ways to their very 
notion of self. It has been noted to be a “right to control access to places, locations, and 
personal information along with use and control rights to these goods.” (Moore, 2008). 
Privacy is composed of both the physical and the mental (Soffer & Cohen, 
2014). Further, the boundary between privacy and other moral concepts –for example, 
property rights, liberty, and self-ownership—is not always clear and distinct” (White, 
2008). Almost everyone has a notion of what privacy is (Kuner, Cate, Millard, & 
Svantesson, 2011). Perhaps Justice Potter Stewart’s approach to indefinable nature of 
obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) could equally be applied to invasions of privacy 
for most Americans, “I know it when I see it.” It is a concept that has arguably 
broadened since the founding of our nation, and can be situational and contextual. In the 
quest to define privacy, it is inherently difficult to explain perceptions and behaviors 
across a range of contexts, and the pace of recent socio-technical development make 
such a notion a moving target (Vasalou, Joinson, & Houghton, 2013). 
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Nevertheless, there are those who would argue that such an elusive, subjective 
approach creates a new dilemma—can someone have a right to something that cannot 
be defined (Lee, 2002)? Does narrowly pinpointing privacy rights limit, rather than 
protect, individual rights (Lee, 2002)? “The Supreme Court itself appears reluctant to 
address privacy expectations involving new technologies, in part because of its own 
lack of understanding and discomfort with such technology” (Baxter, 2012, p. 630). 
Commenting on Justice Sotomayor in U.S. v. Jones (2012), Microsoft Executive 
Vice President and General Counsel Brad Smith said,  
she referred to the fact that traditionally in the United States, secrecy was 
considered a prerequisite to having a reasonable expectation of privacy…in 
other words, for many generations, if you said you wanted to keep something 
private, what you probably were saying is you wanted to keep it a secret. As 
Justice Sotomayor suggested in that opinion, perhaps that definition of privacy 
has changed. (Soper, 2014)  
Smith went on to say,  
In effect, I think the new definition of privacy means people don’t want to keep 
information secret, but they do want to ensure that they control who they share 
information with…they want to control what those people use the information 
for. (Soper, 2014) 
Privacy: Multiple Meanings, Multiple Perspectives 
‘Privacy’ has become a powerful keyword, a shorthand tag that gets used to 
reference a constellation of public attitudes, technical affordances and legal 
arguments. Yet, the concept is so laden with multiple meanings that any use of 
the term begs for added specificity and context. (Madden, 2012, p. 4) 
Privacy is an extremely complex issue. The same term, “privacy,” is used to 
describe numerous very distinct issues. Privacy is a set of rights afforded by law, but the 
invasions of individual privacy by governments that are protected by constitutional and 
regulatory law are different than those protected in the realm of tort law. Online privacy 
is usually a term that we use to talk about efforts to protect sensitive information rather 
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than a set of expectations. For most citizens, privacy has a different meaning in various 
contexts, whether they be the person, the home, personal property, personally 
identifiable information, and digital information. There are very real questions about 
whether these expectations are the same for youth and for adults, as well as whether the 
courts are responding to these groups’ expectations, specifically as they relate to 
governmental search and seizure. 
As we contemplate how ICTs are incorporated into youth culture and their 
expectations about the Fourth Amendment, it is important to deeply consider the 
ethnography of American teens today. There is perhaps no one in contemporary 
America who is providing greater ethnographic understanding of youth attitudes toward 
and practices related to social media, tensions between public and private, social 
network sites, and other intersections between technology and society than danah boyd, 
Ph.D. She points out that teenagers are no different today than they have ever been, they 
are just operating within different constructs. She has said,  
Young people today are doing what young people have always done: trying to 
figure out who they are. By putting themselves in public for others to examine, 
teens are working through how others’ impressions of them align with their self-
perceptions. They adjust their behavior and attitudes based on the reactions they 
get from those they respect. Today’s public impression management is taking 
place online. (boyd, 2007, p. 7) 
Research on attitudes of teens toward digital spaces has been largely 
quantitative, but what emerges is what may seem a selective privacy. As boyd (2008) 
noted: 
First and foremost, the notion of ‘privacy’ is about having a sense of control 
over how and when information flows to who …As kids work to be invisible to 
people who hold direct power over them (parents, teacher, etc.), they happily 
expose themselves to audiences of peers. And they expose themselves to 
corporations.  
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 However, boyd argued that these attitudes toward controlling one’s privacy are 
not new, they are just operating in a new context. Groups that may have historically 
gone to the movies or the mall to “be private in public” and to occupy their own 
communal space may now be participating in a very similar activity by spending time in 
the digital environment. She has said (2008): 
Generation gap and technology ruining everything stories will be forever more. 
These do sell and they are fun to read. Yet, for parents and teachers and other 
concerned folks wanting to get a clear perspective of what’s going on, it’s 
important to remember that at the end of the day, the intentions and desires 
aren’t changing…it’s just the architecture that makes the practices possible that 
is.  
This was also observed by Palfrey & Gasser (2008). They said,   
One of the big differences between what DN are doing in creating and 
experimenting with their identities and interacting with their peers online, and 
what their parents did as teens talking on the telephone, or hanging out at the 
local mall, is that the information that today’s youth are placing into digital 
formats is easily accessed by anyone, including people whom they do not know. 
(p. 30) 
One interesting issue is that teens and their parents are in many cases using the 
same or similar platforms and applications on the same devices, they are just using them 
differently. As of 2011, 90% of all parents of teens 12-17 owned a cell phone, as did 
75% of all teens 12-17 (Madden, 2011). Online social networking (OSN) for teens and 
adults primarily occurs on Facebook. In 2011, over 93% of teen social media users and 
87% of their adult counterparts had profiles on Facebook (Madden, 2011). However, 
while Facebook remains the world’s most popular social media hangout, marketing 
experts caution about a youth exodus from the platform to more instant gratification 
platforms such as Snapchat and Instagram—predicting Facebook will lose 2 million 
users under 25 in 2018 (Guynn, 2018).  
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“Privacy expectations on OSNs seem to be overwhelmingly generation specific” 
(Abril, 2007, p. 4). Both groups claim to place a high priority on privacy, but are they 
all really talking about “privacy” in the same way? According to Abril (2007), the 
distinction between digital immigrants and natives frames the debate regarding the very 
existence of privacy online. “Digital native’s complex expectations of privacy on OSNs 
rest on a combination of technology, the anonymity of the multitude, and assumptions 
about the presence of their unintended audiences” (p. 5). And further Abril (2007) 
indicates, “Theirs is a conception of privacy rooted in their perceived entitlement of 
selective anonymity” (p. 5). 
Here Abril (2007) drew a very clear distinction between digital immigrants and 
digital natives. 
Digital immigrants, on the other hand, grew up in a world where they had the 
luxury of control over the information. Their era gave them the opportunity to 
successfully rewrite their personal histories through legal and social 
mechanisms: criminal records could be expunged, foolish marriages could be 
annulled, shameful teenage pregnancies could be covered up by ‘moving away,’ 
and all was forgotten. (p. 5)  
It would seem that for some, OSNs are a place to be public and exposed and for 
some they are a place of protection or seclusion from a society that keeps few of their 
secrets. “Disturbingly for the digital immigrants, the digital medium has eviscerated an 
individual’s control over her personal information” (Abril, 2007, p. 6).  As legislative 
bodies work to keep up, technology is expanding and growing beyond their pace of 
capacity to employ protections. “Unfortunately, the privacy law, technology, and ethics 
have not caught up to the harms they purportedly protect and redress” (Abril, 2007, p. 
6). 
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This problem may be complicated by the fact that digital immigrants are making 
laws to protect digital natives when they view the role of technology in somewhat 
different ways. “The primary difficulty for digital immigrants is that they’re fighting 
against their own instinct, which is to pull the trigger on the digital natives. The 
generation gap will continue to widen until the digital natives become CEOs and HR 
executives themselves.” (Palfrey, 2007, p. 5). 
Privacy, in terms of the majority of research available, involves privacy control 
mechanisms in OSNs, protecting information from corporation or third party content 
providers, and protecting minors from exploitation. To my knowledge, no research has 
been done to determine the expectations of privacy that teens and their parents have 
concerning ICTs that intersect with public schools and their need to preserve order. 
The best we can do is to infer or attempt to predict what these groups would 
consider reasonable in light of their attitudes toward other aspects of privacy. One area 
where there has been shown a divide in privacy behaviors is gender. “Women who 
maintain social media profiles are significantly more likely than men to keep their 
profiles private” (Madden, 2012, p. 5). There is also a gender and generational 
difference in attitudes toward previous posts.  
Male profile owners are almost twice as likely as female profile owners to 
profess regret for posting content (15% vs. 8%). Young adults are also 
considerably more prone to regret; 15% of profile owners ages 18-29 say they 
have posted content they later regret, compared with just 5% of profile owners 
ages 50 and older. (Madden, 2012, p. 11) 
 An individual’s beliefs about privacy and actual privacy behaviors often do not 
necessarily align. This major disconnect has manifested to social scientists particularly 
in people’s attitudes and practices around information privacy online. “When asked, 
people say that privacy is important to them; when observed, people’s actions seem to 
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suggest otherwise (Madden, 2012, p. 4).” This clouds the issue of privacy, calls into 
question the reasonableness of articulated expectations of privacy, and could be a cause 
for concern for those working to ensure protection of privacy. 
In small ways in what have become routine behaviors, NetGeners are eroding 
their privacy without being conscious of their choices– or understanding their 
consequences (Tapscott, 2009). “Digital Natives (Palfrey & Gasser, 2008) are much 
more willing than their grandparents were in their day to share personal information 
with others – both friends and people they haven’t met face to face – in a public forum, 
which for a Digital Native is the Internet (p. 23).” Recent controversies about how data 
from routinely used apps such as Facebook and Google Maps highlight the ways 
individuals are inadvertently granting access to their information to third parties who 
may have less than noble intentions.  
The net generation is opening up to a degree that astounds their parents. Many 
Facebook enthusiasts post any scrap of information they have about themselves 
and others online, for all their friends to see – from digital displays of affection 
to revealing pictures. (Tapscott, 2009) 
In his book Grown Up Digital, Tapscott (2009) references a 2007 Carnegie 
Mellon study that showed that “40 percent of those who expressed the highest possible 
concern about protecting their class schedule still posted it on Facebook and 47 percent 
of those concerned about political views still provided them.” (p. 66). In 2007, only 
20% of Facebook users even bothered using the privacy features available on Facebook 
(Tapscott, 2009).  
However, these users are not naïve to the potential immediate consequences, nor 
to the methods for insulating content. As early as 2005, researchers showed that seventh 
and eighth graders demonstrated an adult level of understanding of potential negative 
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consequences of internet use (Youn, 2009). In 2011, the Pew Research Center (PRC)’s 
Internet Project & American Life Spring Tracking Survey showed that over half of 
social networking site users over the age of 18 chose to make their online profile 
“private.” This includes those of all ages, from 18 to over 65. At least 16% in every age 
category kept their data partially private (Madden, 2012). 
In fact, usage patterns in social media suggest that age is of the strongest 
variables. Yet, while younger users of social media may be the most active users of 
applications and managers of their online reputations, privacy choices tend to be 
consistent among all users. How teens use the ICTs and OSNs may be different, but 
their methods of protection are very much the same. The choices routinely made by 
adults related to privacy settings are virtually identical to those made by teens using 
social media- regardless of whether they are a habitual user of social media or an 
occasional consumer, with no significant variation across age groups (Madden, 2012). 
Matt Cohler, former Facebook strategy chief said:  
in the past, privacy basically meant something was either visible to everybody or 
hidden from everybody…private meant it’s a secret, or it’s something that I 
don’t share with other people. And I think what privacy is coming to mean 
today- for this generation that’s kind of always plugged into this grid, and as 
more and more people in older generations also get plugged into the grid, I think 
the definition changed for them too—is less about kind of totally public versus 
totally hidden, and more about giving people the ability to control what 
information they’re sharing with whom. (Tapscott, 2009, p. 69) 
Legislatures and policymakers are scrambling to keep pace with the rapidly 
changing world of ICTs. There are very few statutes that are on point to outline privacy 
rights in ICTs and obligations and authority for schools beyond a basic notion of 
possession and limitations on use of mobile phones. Notably, in 2015, California passed 
SB 178 is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. This law prevents state actors 
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from accessing electronic device information by means of physical interaction or 
electronic communication with the electronic device without a warrant, wiretap order, 
subpoena, or specific consent. Attempts to modify the law to grant schools more lenient 
access to search cell phones failed early in 2018. A less restrictive bill pending in the 
Connecticut legislature would limit searches of cell phones at schools to the power of 
administrators only, and only when the T.L.O. criteria are met. 
In their famous article, The Right to Privacy, Justices Warren and Brandeis 
(1890) wrote, 
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a 
principle as old and the common law; but it has been found necessary from time 
to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, 
social and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the 
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society. (p. 
193) 
While their words were aimed at the common law, the explosion of use and 
expansion of capabilities of ICTs have come at such a pace that codified laws strain to 
grow to meet society’s new demands. A complicating issue for the protection of privacy 
in a digital atmosphere is also made clear by this more than a century-old piece, “the 
right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his 
consent” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 218). 
It is clear that ICTs are rapidly changing the way our society interacts and 
communicates. Much research has been done to expose privacy behaviors related to 
new digital domains, however, little research shows the expectations of teens and their 
adult counterparts as individuals or private citizens protected by the Constitution rather 
than consumers. There is a great opportunity to expand this research to ensure that law 
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and policymakers have the adequate information to create effective strategies to 
preserve freedoms and ensure order. 
While many privacy behaviors related to chosen settings, etc., may be 
generalized across all ages, perceptions of the level that privacy is protected has been 
shown to vary between adults and youths. “Although some privacy concerns are 
consistent across age groups, research has shown that youth generally have significantly 
lower expectations of privacy than adults (Baxter, 2012, p. 610).” That is not to say that 
they do not have formed impressions about the issue, and perhaps how they view digital 
devices. Some research suggests that many adults treat digital contents the way they 
would a related physical depository decades ago- an address book, a photo album, a 
phone bill. In essence, the difference may be in how they treat the device – merely in a 
traditional property sense, or something more.  
Parents commonly felt none of their children’s possessions should ethically be 
excluded from their right to monitoring, teens felt strongly that cell phones, especially 
text messages, were private and should not be monitored (Cranor, Durity, Marsh, & Ur, 
2014). Though 48% of parents have looked through their teen’s phone call records or 
text messages (Pew, 2016) teens are more comfortable with their parents accessing 
more rarely used application like email or Facebook than text messages (Cranor, et al., 
2014). 
In the absence of technical expertise, parents make privacy decisions about teens 
by drawing false analogies to the physical world or outdated concepts (Cranor, et al., 
2014). All the parents in the relatively small sample of parents and teens in a 2014 
privacy study noted their view of teen privacy is different than that of their parents 
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when they (the now parents) were the same age (Cranor, et al., 2014). “A large part of 
the gap between parents’ and teens’ privacy decision making process appeared to be 
predicated on whether they thought similarly about privacy in the physical world” 
Cranor, et al., 2014, p. 28). Things their parents would have hidden under a bed, the 
teens hid in their phones. 
This difference in conception is particularly problematic given the role these 
digital devices play in the lives of students today. “Treating smart devices as any other 
chattel property fails to take into account the way these devices integrate in their 
owners’ private lives.” (Roux & Falgost, 2013, p. 192).  
There are also data to suggest that students value privacy in a much more 
situational sense, rather than to apply blanket rules. In communities in which 
socioeconomics limit youth access to devices, students may willingly share unprotected 
access to their friends on their own devices. Friends may share passwords with one 
another or loan devices to others without “logging out” of applications containing 
communications or data they would not willingly share with a parent. “Whereas they 
might like to keep things private from their parents, they may not feel the need to 
protect information from peers or strangers.” (Baxter, 2012, p. 612). 
In another study, “(m)ore than half of the respondents shared their password 
with another person and over a third of them would use Facebook apps through which 
they know that personal data are passed on to third party developers.” (Soffer & Cohen, 
2014, p. 155). 
In their thought experiment, Brian Roux and Michael Falgoust (2013) explored 
how employing extended cognition and the cognitive role of smart devices affects the 
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expectations of privacy and potential for injury to owners of devices subject to search or 
seizure. “When we consider smart devices as cognitive extensions, we find that users 
have an interest in maintaining privacy over their devices congruent with the desire to 
maintain the privacy of the mind” (Roux & Falgost, 2013, p. 193). 
There may be some disconnect between what an individual believes should be 
protected as private and what the law actually protects. This springs from the objective 
component of the way courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment. 
The objective part of the Fourth Amendment test asks whether ‘society’ is 
prepared to accept a given subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable. Since 
‘society’ is presumably composed of people from all segments of the population, 
the answer may vary depending upon which group’s beliefs prevail. (Baxter, 
2012, p. 621) 
Whether protection applies may depend on whether the individual’s beliefs are 
shared by the larger population. 
Privacy is an area in which one could argue that research is failing to adequately 
inform current practices. In a 2011 report, Smith, Dinev & Xu shared their findings of 
an evaluation of 320 privacy articles and 128 books and book sections. They argue that 
the volume of studies published in recent decades, regardless of their compelling 
theoretical frameworks or sound, rigorous, methodology, have resulted in very little 
cumulative contribution to knowledge. The findings and the theories that emerged have 
often relied on overlapping constructs nestled within loosely bounded nomological 
networks.” (Smith, Dinev & Xu, 2011, p. 990). 
The report indicates that scholarship on privacy has cumulatively sought to 
answer one of three major questions: 1) what is (and is not) privacy; 2) what is the 
relationship between privacy and other constructs; and 3) to what extent does context 
matter in the relationships between privacy and other constructs (Smith, Dinev & Xu, 
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2011, p. 992)? In their criticism of the available research, they suggest that future 
inquiry would benefit from the consideration of actual outcomes rather than attempting 
to ascertain intent, and to reveal specific organizational outcomes and consequential 
decisions of breaches of understood privacy. 
The stream of modern privacy research had its genesis in the 1970s. In the 
subsequent four decades, a number of useful studies have been conducted and 
published, but the overall research stream has been sub optimized because of its 
disjointed nature. (Smith, Dinev & Xu, 2011, 1008) 
Minors can be particularly difficult to access in order to conduct large sample 
studies, so much of the research of this type are conducted outside the realm of 
traditional social science. As a result, much of the available data is tied to topics related 
to consumer usage and preferences, marketing issues and privacy as it related to sharing 
data with third party applications and in the context of online social networking. Little 
has been done to evaluate how student’s view privacy in access to actual ICT devices, 
particularly in the school setting.  
There remain many unanswered questions when it comes to how the Fourth 
Amendment applies when technology is at issue. “This uncertainty persists, in part, 
because courts often seem unwilling or unable to address how privacy rights are 
affected by technology.” (Baxter, 2012, pgs. 629-30). These are waters that many 





Chapter 4: Searches in the Public Schools 
Public education outside of specific programs funded by the federal government 
has historically been seen as a function of the individual states. While there were some 
public schools at the time of the framing of the Constitution, they were not widespread, 
and the content and context of their constituencies were very different than what we 
know today. Public schools with compulsory attendance, teaching academic curriculum 
that serves students of all genders and races are largely representative of changes taking 
place from the late 19th Century through the mid-20th Century. 
There are four main cases in which the Supreme Court has ruled on aspects of 
Fourth Amendment rights of students in public schools. Two deal with searching of the 
person and possessions of students on suspicion of possession of drugs, and the other 
two deal with drug testing. 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
The first case in which the Supreme Court considered the Fourth Amendment 
rights of students in the public-school setting came in the 1985 case of New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. Prior to the landmark case, the public schools’ relationship with students fell 
under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, or “in place of the parents” (Rossow 
& Stefkovich, 2014). This meant that the authority of the parent was delegated to the 
student’s teachers and authorities at the school in such measure of restraint and 
correction as might be necessary (Rossow & Stefkovich, 2014). 
Upon being observed smoking in a lavatory (in violation of school policy), a 
student (T.L.O.) was called to the principal’s office. She promptly denied having 
smoked at all. The principal searched her purse. As expected, a package of cigarettes 
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was observed. However, the principal also viewed a package of rolling papers that led 
them to believe T.L.O. might have used them in using marijuana. Upon closer 
inspection of the purse, the principal found a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, several 
empty plastic bags, a large amount of cash in small bills, an index card that appeared to 
be a list of students that owed money to T.L.O., and two letters which implicated her in 
dealing marijuana. The evidence was turned over to the local police. 
In its evaluation the Court held that the search of a student at school must be 
based on a reasonableness standard. Any search must, first, be justified at its inception – 
meaning there are reasonable grounds upon which to suspect a search will yield 
evidence of a violation of school policy or law. Further, the search must be reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. 
Specifically, the measures adopted must be reasonable related to the objectives of the 
search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction. Given the circumstances of the case, the Court found that the 
school’s actions did not run afoul of Fourth Amendment. 
Vernonia v. Acton 
The Court would not revisit Fourth Amendment issues in the public schools 
until ten years later in Vernonia v. Action (1995). Based on widespread rumors of drug 
use among its high school student athletes, the Vernonia school district enacted a drug 
testing policy by which all student athletes and their parents were to sign a waiver 
agreeing to and submitting to urinalysis at the beginning of the season and randomly 
throughout the season. When their child was denied participation in their chosen 
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activity for their refusal to consent to the testing, the Actons filed suit against the district 
alleging the scheme amounted to an illegal search and seizure. 
The Court held the program, designed as it were to curb district-wide issues 
related to drug use, did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court stressed the “special needs” of 
enforcement of laws and regulations in public schools. It noted that students in general 
have a lessened expectation of privacy in the school setting, and given the routine 
physical examinations, shared locker rooms, and other circumstances that student 
athletes subject themselves to greater regulations and intrusions of privacy than the 
average student. 
Earls v. Independent School District No. 2 of Pottawatomie County 
By 2002, an Oklahoma battle over an expansion of the drug testing policy in 
Vernonia reached the Supreme Court. In Board of Education v. Earls (2002), the school 
district in Tecumseh, OK had established a suspicionless drug testing policy by which 
all students in any extra-curricular activity must submit to urinalysis drug testing as a 
condition in order to participate.  
Again, the Court considered “special needs”, viewing the policy as furthering 
the district’s legitimate interest in protecting students against the dangers of drug use. 
However, it seemed to dismiss the notion that rumors of drug abuse substantiated the 
policy enacted in Vernonia, and focused on a general need to curb drug use among the 
student body. 
 It is a mistake… to think that the phrase ‘compelling state interest,’ in the 
Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of 
governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering insolation 
the question: Is there a compelling state interest here? Rather, the phrase 
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describes an interest that appears important enough to justify the particular 
search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively 
intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy (Vernonia v. Acton, 1995).” 
As such, the Court found the random drug testing of high school athletes did not 
violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. 
Safford v. Redding 
The most recent Fourth Amendment case involving a school district to come 
before the Supreme Court dealt with the strip searching of a student. In Safford v. 
Redding (2009), a 13 year-old female student was suspected of distributing drugs at 
school. The use of the term “drugs” however was a bit of a misnomer. Rather than an 
illegal substance, the suspicion was that the student was distributing a common, over 
the counter pain reliever. While students were, by policy, supposed to turn over any 
medication to the school nurse, possession of the suspected substance would have been 
a rule violation, but not illegal under state or federal law.  
When called to the office, the student denied the accusation and offered to let 
the assistant principal search her belongings. The assistant principal and an aide 
searched the student’s backpack and found nothing. The aide was then directed to take 
the student to the nurse’s office to search her clothing. The student was told to remove 
her outer clothing, shoes, and socks. Standing in her undergarments, the student was 
directed to pull out her bra and shake it, as well and to pull out on her underpants and 
shake them.  
Perhaps shocked by the final elements of this series of events, the Court found 
the search to be excessively intrusive in scope in light of the age and sex of the student, 
as well as the nature of the suspected infraction. While the Court found the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the student, due to the disparate case 
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precedents at the lower court level, the school actors were granted qualified immunity 
against personal liability. 
The Reasonableness Standard 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) established that “(t)he accommodation of…the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on 
probable cause” (p. 341). In establishing this standard based on reason, the Court 
recognized that schools have very different missions and training components than law 
enforcement, and to hold them to the same standard would subject them to unreasonable 
obligations. 
The downfall is that reasonableness can be a very subjective standard in general. 
This becomes more problematic when one considers the generational nature of these 
disputes in the school setting. What a judge, someone with decades of experience 
employed in public schools, and a student believe to be reasonable may very well be 
quite different, and likely so. 
Warrantless Searches in Public Schools 
In general, the Supreme Court has ruled many exceptions to the probable cause 
and warrant requirements in various law enforcement contexts over the years (see 
Chapter 2). Among these are investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches 
incident to a valid arrest, seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, 
consensual searches, vehicle searches, container searches, inventory searches, border 
searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special 
needs of law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements 
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impracticable (Rossow & Stefkovich, 2014). Among these are searches in the public- 
school setting, so long as they follow the guidelines set forth in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
(1985), as refined by Safford v. Redding (2009). 
Summary of Guidance Concerning Fourth Amendment Searches in Public Schools 
While some of the pieces of the puzzled history of school searches may seem 
complex, the Fourth Amendment rights of students in public schools established by 
T.L.O. and its progeny can be summed up as follows. First, students do not leave their 
rights at the schoolhouse gates. The Fourteenth Amendment applies the strictures of the 
U.S. Constitution to the system of public schools established by the individual states. 
Students have Fourth Amendment rights in public schools, but the nature of the 
environment necessitates they have a lessened expectation of privacy in the public-
school setting. 
School officials need not have a warrant to conduct a search of a student or their 
belongings for infractions of school rules or illegal activity with a nexus to the school, 
nor do they need meet the law enforcement requirement of probable cause to search. 
Rather, they must have a reasonable suspicion that contraband or the evidence of 
wrongdoing will be unearthed in the search. These searches must meet reasonableness 
standards. 
Whether a search has taken place depends on whether a school actor has caused 
an interruption to the bodily integrity of the student’s person or their belongings in a 
context in which a student had an expectation of privacy, and whether that expectation 
was one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Whether such a search of a 
student or their belongings in the public school setting is reasonable under the Fourth 
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Amendment may be determined by an analysis of whether the search was justified at its 
inception (by reasonable individual suspicion), and reasonable in scope (reasonably 
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction). Random, suspicionless searches 
are generally prohibited, except in the case of generalized sweeps of school owned 
lockers or parking lots, metal detector and similar security procedures, or classroom 
















Chapter 5: Procedures and Analytical Approach 
The qualitative evaluation of Fourth Amendment law that precedes this chapter 
was conducted using traditional methods of legal inquiry incorporating primary and 
secondary sources of law as well as a variety of tools (Permuth & Mawdsley, 2006). 
While, as Russo (Permuth & Mawdsley, 2006) stated, “systematic inquiry in the law 
can be described as a form of historical-legal research that is neither qualitative nor 
quantitative” (p.6), the legal research in this inquiry operates most like a documentary 
form of qualitative research. “All qualitative research approaches employ an inductive 
approach, are naturalistic and holistic, are concerned with process, value subjective 
analysis, generalize from single or multiple instances, and search for meaning within 
experience” (Permuth & Mawdsley, 2006, p. 34).  
According to Lee & Alder (Permuth & Mawdsley, 2006), qualitative research 
rests on three basic assumptions. First,  
qualitative methods seek to understand phenomena in their entirety in order to 
develop a complete understanding of a person, program or situation; second, the 
researcher does not impose much of an organizing structure or make 
assumptions about the interrelationships among the data prior to making the 
observations; and, it is a discovery-oriented approach in the natural 
environment. (p. 34) 
The qualitative analysis that follows in the subsequent chapter will apply 
Maxwell’s legitimation framework (Permuth & Mawdsley, 2006) to work toward 
descriptive, interpretive, theoretical and evaluative validity, and primarily internal, 
analytical generalizability. 
The legal component of this study involved searching the Lexis/Nexis Academic 
database for federal cases including the terms “Fourth Amendment,” phone, and 
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student. Cases were then individually analyzed to isolate cases that included the 
following criteria: 
1. The facts that gave rise to the complaint occurred at a public school or at a 
time and place that a student was in custody of the school at a sponsored or sanctioned 
event or activity. 
2. The cause of action is one in which the plaintiff alleges a public-school 
district or its officers, administrators, employees, or related representatives infringed on 
the Fourth Amendment rights of a student. 
3. The facts allege a search of a cell phone. 
Upon identification, these cases were summarized based on their facts, holding, 
rationale, date and court. Of particular interest in the analysis were any statements that 
purported to describe the reasonable expectation of privacy as it relates to student rights.  
After screening and refining a list of over 800 cases in the initial search, I 
identified what I believe to be all published or accessible federal court cases in the 
United States in which a Fourth Amendment claim was made against a public-school 
district or public-school employee where the complaint alleged an illegal search of a 
student’s cell phone. A summary of these cases is outlined in the findings. Most cases 
of this nature involve a number of claims and parties, and are often muddied by 
procedural complications. While the general fact patterns are presented, this research 
attempts to show how the various courts represented demonstrate their view of the 
privacy rights of students in cell phones on campus and what expectations of privacy 
they deem reasonable in the text of their opinions. As such, complicated pleadings, the 
entire rulings and discussions of the courts are not presented, but rather the facts giving 
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rise to the applicable Fourth Amendment claim and an overview of the courts’ 
discussions and decisions as they relate to the research questions are presented. 
The second component of the study sought to give meaning and insight to 
students’ expectations of privacy in cell phone devices through synthesizing both 
empirical social science research and cultural cues through ethnographic document 
analysis of a variety of texts ranging from peer reviewed journals and papers and other 
traditional scholarship, to samples of news articles and online social networks. 
This component was conducted with both inductive and deductive approaches to 
content analysis. “Major shifts in research and theorizing in qualitative methods and 
media/communication studies have contributed to the intellectual foundation of 
document analysis.” (Altheide, 2013, p.1.) In as qualitative content analysis is “a 
method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the 
systematic classification of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005, p. 1278), the method was employed to make meaning of the privacy 
expectations of students in cell phones through various lenses. As opposed to qualitative 
content analysis, this approach allows the researcher to “examine meanings, themes and 
patters that may be manifest or latent in a particular text. It allows researchers to 
understand social reality in a subjective but systematic scientific manner.” (Zhang & 
Wildemuth, 2005). This approach allowed for analysis of the discursive construction of 
meaning related to student privacy expectations. 
Qualitative researcher Johnny Saldana (2014) famously stated, “qualitative 
research is kinda like meat loaf: ever’body got their own way of makin’ it”. The rate of 
expansion of internet available texts and the proliferation of online social networks have 
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resulted in the employment of a variety of approaches to making meaning of this wealth 
of content. The current lack of quantitative research about the privacy beliefs of public 
school students in the United States led me to explore ethnographic content analysis as a 
way to make meaning of the potentially shared or differing expectations of students and 
the parents, school leaders, and tangential adults making and interpreting law and 
policy. 
The development of ethnographic content analysis (a distinctive version of 
qualitative media analysis) and its use by researchers was influenced by an awareness 
by many researchers that simply studying the content of the mass media was not 
enough; it was also important to be aware of the process, meanings, and emphases 
reflected in the content, including discursive practices (Altheide, 2013). 
In order to accomplish this aspect of the study, the following questions were 
formulated: 
a. What does the media say about the privacy of students as related to cell 
phones at school? 
b. Do these perspectives align with those outlined by the identified federal 
court cases?  
 
The development the structures for seeking texts for this analysis was a reflexive 
process. Through trial initial phases of the searches, it was determined that the addition 
and removal of various search terms led to samples with the greatest potential to answer 
the research questions.  
Ethnographic content analysis is used to document and understand 
the communication of meaning, as well as to verify theoretical relationships. Its 
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distinctive characteristic is the reflexive and highly interactive nature of the 
investigator, concepts, data collection and analysis (Altheide, 1987). As such, trends 
and themes were identified in order to narrow the focus of my research procedures, as 
well as to avoid explorations that were too far afield of this project. For example, there 
are many recent instances of teachers being recorded by students using cell phones in 
various school settings, resulting in much discussion about privacy rights of school 
employees. Many states and school districts are grappling with how to accommodate 
students who identify as transgender, particularly in regard to their right to gender 
specific bathrooms, invoking a robust privacy debate. While these and other topics 
leave much room for future research, they were beyond the scope of my research 
questions and search terms and deselection criteria were established to eliminate 
representation of research, commentary, or debate on these topics. Procedures for 
analysis are outlined in detail below. 
Advanced online searches were conducted on search engines Lexis/Nexis 
Academic, Google Scholar and ProQuest social sciences database, as well as more 
mainstream media engines including RSS Reader Feedly, Google and Lexis/Nexis 
Newspaper and the online social network Twitter between the date of the Riley decision 
on June 25, 2014, and March of 2018. Search terms were reflexively modified and 
utilized in various combinations to elicit as many rich texts as possible to fit within the 
inclusion parameters. Texts were initially analyzed and identified for inclusion based on 
whether they purported to explore or in some way depict rights of students or 
perspectives on student rights related to cell phones and the Fourth Amendment. While 
these searches may not provide a full depiction of every mention of the research topic in 
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the time frame between the Riley decision and writing, they give a quality representative 
sample with as much commonality with the language employed by courts as was 
practicable. 
Due to the novel nature of this research, certain delimitations were necessary. 
When modern school discipline and student rights are considered, it would show 
ignorance or deliberate indifference on the part of the researcher to neglect the potential 
contributions that critical race theory, gender and LGBTQ theories, sexual violence, the 
greater context of the school-to-prison pipeline and others might offer to the topic. 
While these frameworks are beyond the scope of the current research, the writer views 
these as ripe areas for future inquiry on this and related subjects. 
For all texts analyzed, deselection based on a number of criteria greatly limited 
the samples. Since the focus of this research is Fourth Amendment protections in public 
schools in the United States, any text originating in or representing a perspective from 
outside the United States was eliminated. As were those dealing with subject matter 
related to private schools, colleges, universities and technical schools. Further, while 
privacy concerns of students related to their identification as LGBT or transsexual, and 
unauthorized recording of pictures, audio and video of students in bathrooms and locker 
rooms are prominently represented in much current rhetoric, texts related to these topics 
were not included unless they referred to the search of a cell phone in a public school. 
Texts representing or based on fact patterns of teachers involved in predatory or 
otherwise illegal activity were eliminated from the sample, as were those regarding the 
privacy rights teachers enjoy in cell phones at school unless they highlighted differences 
between student and teacher rights. Other criteria for deselection included topics related 
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to privacy behaviors of students pertaining to disclosure of information to third party 
applications and developers. Privacy rights and behaviors associated with computers, 
laptops, tablets, and school district owned instructional technology were not considered. 
Searches in Lexis/Nexis Academic, Google Scholar, and Proquest were 
conducted using the search terms student AND phone AND school AND “expectation 
of privacy;” excluded terms were LGBT transgender. I explored only full-text scholarly 
journals written in English. Since scholarly work is typically conducted by individuals 
with affiliations with post-secondary institutions, control for terms like college or 
university was conducted post-search by screening each individual article. As law 
reviews are discussed in previous chapters, these were eliminated from this evaluation. 
In order to present a feel for mass and online media treatment of the issue I 
conducted two separate searches. First, I used the RSS reader Feedly to search a variety 
of media outlets for the terms student + privacy + phone + school + search + “Fourth 
Amendment.” In Google, I searched from the date of the Riley decision to March 2018 
for search terms student + phone + school + “expectation of privacy” NOT LGBT or 
transgender. In Lexis/Nexis I conducted a newspaper search from the date of the Riley 
decision to March 2018. Search terms included student + phone + school + “expectation 
of privacy” NOT LGBT or transgender. In order to control for the number of 
publications represented in the search engine that subscribe to national media services, 
newswires and distributors such as the Associated Press, I eliminated those with high 
similarity.  
For the texts from newspapers and media stories, each text was assigned a 
numerical identifier. Each document was then subjected to two layers of coding. This 
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coding matched that of the tweets; the first layer identified the voice or perspective 
represented: 1) student, 2) parent, and 3) other. Then each of these three categories were 
then analyzed for the level of privacy rights that each implied for students related to cell 
phones at school. These included, 1) School has no right to search phones at school, 2) 
Students have privacy unless a warrant or T.L.O.-like suspicion gives rise to a search, 
and 3) Students have no privacy rights to cell phones at school. When coding was 
complete, I undertook efforts to make meaning of the messages from each perspective 
to determine whether any trends or themes emerged and whether the students’ 
perspectives (if they were represented) aligned with the adult populations’ represented 
perspectives. 
The four most popular social media or online social network platforms for in the 
United States are Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram and Twitter (Pew, 2018). Because of 
the nature of the applications, Facebook, Snapchat and Instagram content is often 
limited by the accountholder to an audience of only those given permission, in a friends 
group, or a direct recipient. Therefore, data mining in these platforms is much more 
limited. Further, while blogs and online forums likely serve as a rich source for future 
data, their formats and content are much different that Twitter. To ensure the broadest 
sample, the social media component of this research focused on Twitter. 
 I performed an advanced Twitter search for content between the date of the 
Riley decision and March 22, 2018. The terms “school” and “phone” in combination 
with “privacy,” “4th,” “amendment,” “amend,” or “Fourth” were selected. Excluded 
terms were “college” and “university.” No identifying information about the author of 
the tweets was retained. As each tweet was analyzed, those that were obviously not 
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originating or commenting on issues in the United States, posts by legal professionals or 
professional organizations, and those posts from commercial enterprises were excluded. 
Also excluded were posts regarding perceptions of privacy obviously referring to 
intrusions by peers, relating to the privacy rights of deceased individuals involved in 
school violence, and privacy rights involving the use of electronics in school bathrooms 
were determined to be outside the scope of this research. 
These tweets were uploaded to Discovertext for coding. Utilizing the software, I 
generated a word cloud (see Appendix A). In the initial coding, I coded the content of 
the tweet, as much as could be determined, by the voice of the author, 1) student, 2) 
parent, and 3) other. Each of these three categories were then analyzed for the level of 
privacy rights that each implied for students related to cell phones at school. These 
included, 1) School has no right to search phones at school, 2) Students have privacy 
unless a warrant or T.L.O.-like suspicion gives rise to a search, and 3) Students have no 
privacy rights to cell phones at school. I then attempted to make meaning of the 
messages from each perspective to determine whether any trends or themes emerged 
and whether the students’ perspectives aligned with the adult populations represented. 
In the case of school policies, I did a Google search for school AND policy 
AND “cell phone” AND search. I did not evaluate policies that treated cell phones in 
the general category of student searches and searches of their belongings without 
specifically mentioning phones. Nor did I review policies concerning whether a student 
had the right to possess or use a cell phone while at school. Rather, the only policies 
selected for analysis were those that specifically addressed searches of cell phones in 
the public-school context. These policies were assigned numerical identifiers. They 
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were coded in three ways: 1) Search policies that refer to language authorizing searches 
based on T.L.O. analysis, 2) Policies in which students are forewarned that their 
possession of cell phones at school served as the equivalent of a consent to their search, 
and 3) Other. These levels of policy established privacy expectations were assumed to 
represent an adult/parent/educator perspective and were compared with student 
perceptions identified in the other levels of document searches to determine whether 
they aligned. It should be noted that I discovered thousands of school districts across the 
country use some version of sample policies available through services of National 
School Boards Association affiliate organizations. These will be discussed separately in 
the findings. 
The coded results of these searches were then grouped and analyzed for trends 
and disparity in perspective within representative groups. These trend and disparity 
categories represent the substantive findings of the document analysis, and as 
previously stated partially include differing perspectives among adults, and varying 
student perceptions ranging from disgust at their lack of privacy rights in their cell 
phones to a position that school actors should have no right to search their devices. 
Most importantly, these grouped texts were used in synthesis to establish general 
privacy expectation for students and adults and compared with the privacy expectations 
evidenced by the federal court cases analyzed. This analysis was used to develop the 
final conclusions and recommendations for practice and future research. 
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Chapter 6: Findings 
Overview 
Overall, this I find most federal circuit and appellate courts that have published 
opinions related to searches of student phones in public schools dedicate little or no 
portion of their discussion to the actual rights of students or establishing what may be 
reasonable in a student’s expectation of privacy in a cell phone in the public school 
context. What is clear, is that, absent further direction from the Supreme Court, the 
touchstone and best guidance for the future about how best to evaluate searches of 
student cell phones remains the structure set forth in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
Volumes of scholarly texts are devoted to the privacy behaviors of young people 
in relation to digital information, but none explore students’ privacy expectations in the 
devices that most frequently serve as a portal to that information. Mainstream media has 
done little to report on privacy rights related to cell phones in the school context from 
the student perspective, and social media evidences that students are both troubled by 
the lack of concern for their privacy rights and left feeling powerless about schools’ 
approaches to access to their cell phones while on campus. As school policies from 
across the country show, there remains no clear consensus about how schools may both 
protect student rights and legally maintain order in schools in how they approach 
accessing student data, communication, and other digital content in the context of cell 
phone searches.  
75 
Caselaw: United States District Court Cases 
Klump v. Nazareth Area School District 
In 2004, Christopher Klump was a student at Nazareth High School. Pursuant to 
policy, students at his school were allowed to carry cell phones at school. However, the 
students were forbidden to use or display the phones during school hours.  
On the date in question, Klump’s phone fell out of his pocket and upon his leg. 
Upon viewing Klump’s cell phone, a teacher enforced the policy by confiscating the 
phone. Subsequently, the teacher and an assistant principal went about making phone 
calls using Klump’s phone to numbers in his phone directory to determine whether any 
others were violating the policy. In doing so, the teacher and assistant principal 
accessed Klump’s phone directory, text messages, and voice mail. Furthermore, they 
initiated a conversation with Klump’s younger brother via America Online Instant 
Messaging using Klump’s account and without disclosing that Klump was not the 
person with whom he was communicating.  
Five days later Klump’s parents met with school officials regarding these events. 
During the course of the meeting the assistant principal indicated that, while the phone 
was in her possession, Klump received a message from his girlfriend that included a 
slang ridden directive that he get her a large marijuana cigarette. The assistant principal 
advised that the message served as the basis for her later actions using the phone to 
investigate possible drug use at the school. Before the phone was turned over to the 
parents, evidence of the phone calls and messages made by school employees were 
erased from its memory card. 
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Klump’s parents sued, first in Commonwealth Court, and later removed the 
action to federal court. In the case that became Klump v. Nazareth Area School District, 
425 F.Supp 2d 622 (2006), they alleged a variety of state and federal law claims, 
including that the search of Klump’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District found that the initial 
seizure of the phone was permissible as it was contraband. However, the search of its 
contents failed the T.L.O. standard at the first prong. Specifically, it was not justified at 
its inception. At the time the search was initiated, school actors had no reason to believe 
that Klump had violated any law or other school rule than possession of the cell phone. 
As such, the court refused qualified immunity to the school employees and denied their 
motions to dismiss on the Fourth Amendment claims. 
By accessing Christopher Klump's phone number directory, voice mail and text 
messages, and subsequently using the phone to call individuals listed in the 
directory, defendants Grube and Kocher violated Christopher's Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Although 
the meaning of "unreasonable searches and seizures" is different in the school 
context than elsewhere, it is nonetheless evident that there must be some basis 
for initiating a search. A reasonable person could not believe otherwise. 
Here, according to plaintiffs' allegations, there was no such basis. 
J.W. v. DeSoto County School District 
J.W. v. DeSoto County School District, 2010 U.S. Dist. 09-cv-00155-MPM-
DAS, LEXIS 116328, (N.D. Miss.; Nov. 1, 2010), involved the expulsion of R.W. R.W. 
was expelled after being caught viewing a text message on a cell phone on school 
grounds, in defiance of a school disciplinary rules prohibiting use or possession of a cell 
phone at school. Upon being observed using the phone, a school employee asked for the 
phone. R.W. closed the phone and handed it over. The employee opened the phone to 
review the personal pictures stored on it and taken by R.W. at his home. These included 
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a photo of R.W. in the restroom, as well as a photo of another student holding a B.B. 
gun. 
After viewing the photos, the employee gave the phone to a coach at the school 
who then pressed a button on the phone to reactivate the screen that had gone into a 
dark mode. He then took R.W. to a principal’s office where the principal proceeded to 
examine the photos and share them with a local police sergeant who happened to be in 
the office. The two accused R.W. of having gang photos on his phone, and R.W. was 
promptly suspended for violation of a school rule prohibiting displaying, in any manner, 
on school property any message associated with gang or criminal activity. 
This suspension was reviewed at a disciplinary hearing at which the police 
sergeant told the hearing officer that he recognized gang signs in the photo and knew 
the identity of the student holding the B.B. gun. The principal expressed his view that 
R.W. was a threat to school safety. The hearing officer issued an order of suspension, 
with a recommendation for expulsion. Upon appeal to the board of education, R.W. was 
suspended from August through the remainder of the school year. 
When R.W.’s parents sued in federal court, the United States Court for the 
Northern District of Mississippi found the search to be not contrary to established law, 
focusing on the reduced level of suspicion needed to justify a search as outlined in 
T.L.O. Justified at its inception, the court further concluded that the search was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances. The court distinguished the case from 
Klump, calling Klump a “fishing expedition,” whereas the case at bar presented a search 
it considered to be far more limited in scope and far more justified. It viewed a student’s 
decision to violate the school rules by bringing contraband to school and using that 
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contraband in the view of teachers results in a diminished privacy expectation in that 
contraband. 
The court concluded that the search was not contrary to clearly established law 
and ordered dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claims. 
The court, after having researched nationwide authority on this issue, is unable 
to determine that the search in this case was unlawful clearly supports a 
conclusion that a school teacher lacking legal training should not be forced to 
defend himself at trial for his split-second decision in this regard. (Id at 13) 
The case was later settled. 
Mendoza v. Klein Independent School District 
Of the cases identified in this research, the most extensive evaluation of the 
rights of students came in Mendoza v. Klein Independent School District, No. 09-3895 
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2011). This case involved a 2009 incident in which an associate 
principal viewed an eighth grader showing a group of students something in her hand 
the administrator believed to be a cell phone. As the administrator approached, the 
student turned off the phone and placed it in her pocket. Since district policy dictated 
that any cell phone or pager observed to be used by a student during the school day was 
to be confiscated, the administrator demanded the device be turned over. 
The student became visibly upset and protested that she had not been using the 
phone. She ultimately surrendered the device and went to class. Since the student had 
denied using the phone, the administrator proceeded to turn on the phone to determine 
whether it had been used during school hours. Upon determination that the phone had 
been used during school, the administrator then went about seeking the most recently 
sent text message. Soon upon opening the sent texts the administrator saw a nude 
picture of the student taken in front of a mirror. 
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Called into the office to explain the content, the student explained that she sent 
the photo to a boy in what was an exchange of similar pictures. When asked if she had 
shown the inappropriate images to any other students, the student admitted showing the 
nude photo she had received to a friend. The school principal was notified and told the 
associate principal to contact the local police department. The student’s mother was also 
contacted and asked to come to the school. 
The student was placed in in-school suspension, and subsequently placed in the 
district’s disciplinary alternative education program for 30 days. The phone was turned 
over to law enforcement, and after investigation the child exploitation division of the 
local police precinct decided to destroy the phone. 
After a fruitless appeal to the school board, the student’s mother filed suit 
alleging a number of violations, including Fourth Amendment violations on behalf of 
both the student and her mother. In its initial inquiry of whether there was an alleged 
violation of a constitutional right, the magistrate for the Southern District of Texas 
Southern Division found the contents of the student’s cell phone contained “private 
information, that (the student) had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding this 
information, and that any search of the phone was subject to the limitations of the 
Fourth Amendment” (Id, 2011, at 13). 
After a thorough discussion of the history of school searches through T.L.O. and 
its progeny, the court found that the search in the immediate case was made in 
circumstances very similar to T.L.O. It determined that the administrator had a 
reasonable, individualized suspicion that a search of the phone would show evidence of 
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the student’s violation of the cell phone policy. Further, it found that it was not 
unreasonable for the administrator to seize and search the device for that purpose.  
Discussing both the Klump and J.W. cases, the court also noted that the 
administrator’s own testimony showed she was aware that she could not legally conduct 
and unfettered search of the phone without reasonable suspicion, and that she did not 
need to access the content of any message to determine the student was in violation of 
school rules. The court determined that it could not, “conclude as a matter of law that 
her search of the content of (the student’s) text messages was reasonable” (Mendoza, 
2011, at 27). 
Notably, the arguments in this case included allegations that the student’s 
mother’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the school’s actions. Specifically, 
she argued that she purchased the phone for her daughter and was the paid subscriber 
through the cellular network. It was determined that the mother failed to demonstrate an 
actual subjective expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. She 
did not have a privacy interest in the contents of the phone because the information 
stored on the phone was not hers, but her daughter’s. 
Gallimore v. Henrico County School Board 
The search in Gallimore v. Henrico County School Board (2014), Civil Case 
No.3:14cv009 (E.D. Va.) was based on parental reports of student misconduct on a 
school bus. School officials received reports from two parents that they witnessed a 
student with long hair smoking marijuana on a school bus that morning. That afternoon, 
they brought W.S.G. to the school office, where he was asked to empty his pockets. 
Without explanation he was then searched, including a pat-down of his person and a 
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thorough search of his backpack, shoes, and pockets. Among the items searched were a 
Vaseline jar, a sandwich wrapper, and a cell phone. Upon finding no marijuana, W.S.G. 
was returned to class. 
The court’s T.L.O. inquiry was influenced by the nuances of Safford v. Redding 
(2009). As such, it determined that the school officials met the threshold of needing 
only a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing to validate a search at its 
inception. As to the scope, the court found that all the physical elements searched were 
also permissible in that they could have contained drugs. 
Where the court drew the line, however, was the search of the phone. Since the 
phone could not have contained drugs, this component of the search was not reasonably 
related and exceeded the scope of a reasonable search initiated with the stated aim of 
finding drugs. The court noted that “common sense dictates that a school administrator 
cannot claim to look for marijuana and then look through a student’s cell phone” 
(Gallimore, 2009, at 5). 
Masciotta v. The Clarkstown Central School District 
In Masciotta v. The Clarkstown Central School District, 136 F. Supp. 3d 527 
(S.D. N.Y, 2015), the female student in question reported to the nurse’s office to 
complete a scheduled test. Upon entering the office, she saw a fellow student in the 
office and inquired why her friend was present. She was told it was difficult to explain 
and that she should leave. Later, the friend called her to let her know the reason he was 
in the nurse’s office was because she was questioning him about a purported cut they 
believed she had on her leg and whether he had seen it. He denied seeing anything of 
the sort. 
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Shortly thereafter, the female student was approached by the school social 
worker and asked to accompany her to the nurse’s office. The nurse and social worker 
then told her they were there because of an alleged carving of a cat they believed she 
had on her leg and that it “needed to be checked.” After lodging her opposition to this 
inspection, the student was ushered into a storage closet with the nurse and directed to 
lower her pants to her ankles. They found no cuts or bruises. She was also directed to 
lift her shirt just beneath her bra. The nurse inspected the front of her torso and turned to 
her back and lifted her shirt inspecting her back. Finding no unusual marks, cuts, or 
bruises the student was allowed to leave. 
When the student emerged from the closet, the school’s social worker was on 
the phone with the school psychiatrist and passed the phone to the student. The 
psychiatrist accused the student of not being truthful about cutting herself and claimed 
that she had shown the cuttings to the male student. She then demanded to search the 
student’s phone. Despite her rejections, the psychiatrist proceeded to look through the 
student’s Facebook account, Instagram account, and all her photo albums, finding no 
evidence of cutting, before returning the device. 
The psychiatrist then called the school police officer and told him the student 
had carved a cat into her leg and that it was seen in an Instagram photo, even if they 
discovered no evidence of it on the phone. The student was given the phone to briefly 
speak with the officer before leaving the nurse’s office and running out of the building 
in tears. 
The child’s parent sued in federal court on a number of claims, including that 
the search of the phone violated the student’s Fourth Amendment rights. The United 
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States Court for the Southern District of New York evaluated the claim as a search for 
medical purposes. As such, the court said that, based on the precedential cases argued 
by the parties, that it “cannot say that the Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiff’s 
clearly established right because it was not clearly established that the Defendant’s 
actions were even covered by the Fourth Amendment.” The student’s expectation of 
privacy was not discussed. The Fourth Amendment claim was dismissed. 
DeCossas v. Tammany Parish School Board 
A student was ordered to his school’s chief disciplinarian’s office upon 
allegations of drug related misconduct, specifically that he was involved in the purchase 
or sale of a controlled dangerous substance in the case of DeCossas v. Tammany Parish 
School Board, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44186 (E.D. La. 2017). In the presence of the 
sheriff’s deputy on site, the school administrator searched the student, seized his cell 
phone, and demanded the phone be unlocked. Once the phone was unlocked, the 
disciplinarian, the deputy, and an assistant principal then searched the contents of the 
phone. Upon recognizing the number of another student, the second student was 
brought in for questioning and signed a statement. 
The court noted that “the Fifth Circuit has not spoken directly to the question of 
the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searched conducted by school 
officials in conjunction with law enforcement officers.” (Id , 2017, at 49). It also noted 
the other Fifth Circuit case, J.W. v. Desoto County School District. It summarily 
dismissed Gallimore v. Henrico County School Board (2014) as non-binding precedent 
from outside the circuit. It also distinguished the case from G.C. vs. Owensboro, in that 
the phone was not searched pursuant to general background knowledge, but in relation 
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to specific allegations of purchase, sale, and possession of illegal substances. The 
school and all individual school defendants were granted summary judgment on the 
Fourth Amendment claims. 
Jackson v. McCurry 
The case of Jackson v. McCurry, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21805 (M.D. Ga. 
2017) involved two middle/high school administrators who searched a student’s cell 
phone as part of their investigation into threats against the student. The student, EDJ, 
had allegedly been “bad-talking” another student, making fun of them for not making 
the volleyball team and sending text messages to others about her. When the rumors of 
these slights reached the subject, they responded by threatening EDJ.  
After interviewing other students, an administrator brought EDJ and another 
administrator to his office to get EDJ’s side of the story. She was questioned about the 
messages and denied talking to others about the other student. An administrator then 
told her to unlock her phone and give it to him so that he could see if EDJ had been 
sending messages about the aggrieved student. She claimed she did not give him 
permission to do so, and not only did he review messages with the student with whom 
she allegedly disparaged other students, but also messages from family members, her 
best friend, and her boyfriend. Stating that he did not see any evidence of wrongdoing, 
the administrator then returned the phone. 
Angered that his child’s phone was searched, the student’s father allegedly 
threatened school officials. His access to the school and staff were then limited, and at 
one time he was forcibly removed from school property. He was also prevented from 
voicing his opinions at a school board meeting. 
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The student’s parents sued, individually and on their daughter’s behalf, on a 
number of claims, including that the cell phone search violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia Columbus Division 
noted that the plaintiffs could point to no cases of precedent regarding the search of a 
student cell phone at school from the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh 
Circuit, or the Georgia Supreme Court. Based on a T.L.O. evaluation, the court found 
that the administrators had reasonable grounds to suspect that a search of the text 
messages would reveal evidence that she was violating or had violated the school’s rule 
against harassment. The court found that the search was not overly intrusive given the 
age, sex, and the nature of the infraction. Further, because the student masked the 
identity of some of her contacts with emojis rather than their true names, the scope of 
the search was also permissible. 
Rejecting arguments that Riley should be applied, the court stated that,  
T.L.O. specifically contemplated searches of ‘highly personal items [such] as 
photographs, letters, and diaries’ that students carried to school. Though 
technology has changed since T.L.O. was handed down, a school official’s 
search of a student’s cell phone on school property and during the school day 
still fits within the framework announced in T.L.O. (pg. 18-19) 
As such, the administrator searching the phone was granted qualified immunity on the 
Fourth Amendment claim related to the search of the cell phone. 
United States Courts of Appeal 
G.C. vs. Owensboro Public Schools  
The search of a troubled student led to the suit in G.C. vs. Owensboro Public 
Schools, 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013). As a non-resident student of the Owensboro 
School District, G.C.’s continued enrollment in the district was subject to the 
recommendation of the school principal and the approval of the superintendent. During 
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his freshman year of high school, shortly after experiencing disciplinary problems, G.C. 
communicated with school officials that he used drugs and was disposed to both anger 
and depression.  
Later in the year, he visited an assistant principal and expressed that he was 
upset about an argument with a girlfriend, and had a plan to take his life. He also 
expressed feeling of pressure about sports and that he smoked marijuana to deal with 
the pressure. Subsequently, the administrator met with his parents and suggested he be 
evaluated for mental health issues. He was taken to a treatment facility that day. 
In the following year he had several disciplinary referrals. On the day in 
question he walked out of a meeting with the high school prevention coordinator and 
left the building without permission. G.C. called his father and was located by school 
staff in the parking lot at his car. In the car, tobacco products were in plain view. Upon 
being escorted to the assistant principal’s office he indicated that he was experiencing 
some of the same issues as the previous conversation in which he expressed suicidal 
thoughts. Concerned about his well-being, she checked his cell phone to determine if 
there were any indication he may be contemplating suicide. He visited a treatment 
center that day and was recommended for a stay of one to two weeks. 
Four days later school officials convened a hearing with G.C. and his parents, 
after which he was placed on probation and given four days of in-school suspension. 
Approximately a month later G.C. was suspended for violent behavior. At the 
conclusion of the academic year, the principal recommended the superintendent revoke 
G.C.’s authorization to attend the school for the following year. Rather than follow the 
recommendation, the superintendent met with the student’s parents to explain what was 
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expected of G.C. in order for him to be permitted to continue his attendance at 
Owensboro High School. The options provided to them were to take him back to his 
district of residence, to move to the Owensboro district and attend with all the rights of 
a resident student, or to submit to the condition that any future disciplinary infraction 
would result in the immediate suspension of his right to attend Owensboro High School.  
Less than a month into the school year G.C. violated the school cell phone 
policy by texting in class. His teacher confiscated the phone and turned it over to an 
assistant principal who proceeded to read four text messages on the phone. Her stated 
purpose was “to see if there was an issue with which (she) could help him so that he 
would not do something harmful to himself or someone else.” (Id at 5).  
Following this incident, the principal recommended to the superintendent that 
G.C.’s privileges to attend Owensboro High School be revoked. The superintendent 
agreed. G.C.’s parents were contacted and notified of their right to appeal the decision. 
Approximately a month later school officials met with G.C.’s parents and their 
attorney and explained the revocation. The next week G.C. filed in federal court for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, 
alleging violations of G.C.’s First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights, as well as 
violations of the Kentucky Constitution. Summary judgment was granted on all federal 
claims. 
Upon appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment claims relied on New Jersey v. T.L.O. While G.C. conceded at oral 
argument that the first search of his cell phone was justified in light of the surrounding 
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circumstances, he maintained the second search was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion to read the text messages. 
The court noted that it had never addressed how a T.L.O. inquiry might apply to 
the search of a student’s cell phone and distinguished the facts at issue from those in 
J.W. v. DeSoto County School District (2010), noting “using a cell phone on school 
grounds does not automatically trigger and essentially unlimited right enabling a school 
official to search any content stored on the phone that is not related either substantively 
or temporally to the infraction” (Id at 13). As such, they adopted the fact-based 
approach of Klump v. Nazareth (2006). 
“We disagree, though that general background knowledge of drug abuse or 
depressive tendencies, without more, enables a school official to search a student’s cell 
phone when a search would otherwise be unwarranted” (Id at 14). Clinging to the 
T.L.O. inquiry, the court found there was no reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify 
the search at its inception. 
Though the school district argued that the claim should fail because the student 
did not suffer any demonstrable harm and was not disciplined in any way based on the 
contents of the search, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether any damages would be appropriate.  
Notably, Judge Norris dissented from the Fourth Amendment portion of the 
decision. Specifically, given the circumstances, he found the limited reading of four text 
messages to be reasonable under T.L.O. Under his reasoning, that school officials, 
acting in loco parentis, must be given more leeway that would be appropriate outside 
the school setting, considering their keen interest in student welfare and safety. 
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The court entertained no discussion of the privacy rights of the student. The only 
mention of Fourth Amendment rights were that in the iteration of the complaint and 
quoting another case in the determination of whether damages would be appropriate.  
General Conclusions Concerning Case Law 
In all, the federal caselaw related to student rights with respect to search of cell 
phones in public schools is a patchwork. Very little direction is given to distinguish 
searches of these digital devices from the personal and property searches implicated in 
T.L.O. and its progeny. The issuance of the Riley decision, with its commentary about 
the privacy interests implicated in a device with the potential to disclose such volumes 
of personal information, has had very little impact on how the federal courts view phone 
searches. Furthermore, despite the focus the United States Supreme Court has placed on 
a student’s reasonable expectation of privacy in searches in the school context, 
discussions about student expectations are the exception rather than the rule in federal 
cases involving the search of cell phones. 
The federal cases reported that deal with student privacy rights in cell phones 
are a bit all over the map. While one court stressed that Fourth Amendment rights are 
different in the school context, another suggests that once the device is used in violation 
of law or school rules and becomes contraband, the expectation of privacy diminishes 
even further. 
Another court established that students hold a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in private information contained in a cell phone in language ringing somewhat similar 
to the sentiment of the Supreme Court in Riley v. California (2014), one court felt that 
T.L.O. already contemplated highly personal items brought to school. Another seems 
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willing to uphold cell phone searches when the scope is narrowly aligned with very 
specific allegations of wrongdoing. However, none of these courts have thoroughly 
contemplated the privacy implications of content inadvertently accessed while on a 
narrow fishing expedition. In laymen’s terms, how can you authorize someone to look 
into Pandora’s jar and see only a single evil? 
Other cases don’t even discuss students’ expectations of privacy. In fact, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the only federal appellate court to rule on a cell phone 
case, never discussed the student’s expectation of privacy. Its fact-based approach 
would seem that the electronic revolution that has transformed American society in the 
years that followed T.L.O. in no way diminished the Supreme Court’s standards for 
student searches, regardless of Riley. 
Scholarly and Media Texts 
Mainstream media has covered a great deal about policies concerning possession 
of cell phones and similar devices in public schools. A great deal of attention has been 
paid to the role of these devices in the school setting as well. The debate about whether 
schools are safer when students are allowed to have devices versus the argument that 
they pose a security threat continues. Equally at issue is the question of whether they are 
valuable devices to be used as tools to drive instruction or they are a distraction from 
the educational goals of schools. 
Social Science 
Despite myriad manipulations of search terms and search engines, I was able to 
find no social science exploring students’ privacy beliefs about cell phones at school. 
Many studies involve youth consumer practices related to private information, 
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protection of student data, and privacy behaviors related to online social networks. 
However, no studies have explored student privacy perceptions related to the devices 
that serve as a near instant conduit to the gamut of personal information. 
It is possible that the very laws that aim to protect students prevent quality 
research in this area. In order to gain access to students for research, individual parent 
consent must be granted. Not only is this tedious and limiting in establishing quality 
samples, it all but eliminates the ability to engage students in survey instruments 
presented digitally on the devices with which they are so comfortable and adept. 
This is an area I see as ripe for future research. Not only are courts not 
considering the expectations of privacy of students, there is no social science to support 
reasoning if they should consider them. 
Media Representation 
However, aside from coverage of the court cases outlined above, little has been 
mentioned about the Fourth Amendment rights of students implicated in possession of 
cell phones at public schools. After controlling for the exclusions outlined in Chapter 5, 
I identified 15 unique articles between June 25, 2014 and March 22, 2018, from the 
Feedly, Google, and Lexis/Nexis Newspapers searches combined. 
These articles did not on their face present student or parent/school 
administrator perspectives on the topic, but rather all spoke with a traditional third 
person voice. None of them included quotes from students, teachers, parents, or school 
leaders to offer differing perspectives. 
With the exception of three, these all presented the search of cell phones in 
public schools as legal except for when the criteria set forth in T.L.O. is followed. One 
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article outlined a school district policy in which students are required to provide the 
school the passcode to their phones. Further, the right of the principal or their designee 
to search a student’s cell phone and its contents “including but not limited to, phone 
usage, texting, and images/videos when a reasonable suspicion exists that the student 
violated the District’s Student Responsible Use Guidelines for Technology.” (St. 
Meyer, 2016). Beyond this right, the school administration is also granted the right to 
search the phone as personal property in what appears to be a straightforward T.L.O. 
basis. 
Another took the position that the Riley decision, while not directly related to the 
school setting, had major implications for how schools should view their authority to 
search cell phones. Particularly, this text focused on the Riley decision’s discussion of 
digital information and its contrast to traditional property searches. It stated, "digital is 
different, and therefore the legal standard for school searches of contraband does not 
apply to cell phones.” (Patchin, 2014). 
Of those that aligned their representations of the law with T.L.O., some went 
beyond simply the belief that evidence of a violation of law or school policy might be 
evidenced by the search and focused on exigent security concerns.  
Our best advice to educators is to resist searching a student-owned cell phone 
unless there is a possible safety concern (e.g., a student says that they just 
received a text message from another student who said they have a gun). And in 
this kind of situation, it is best to turn the case over to law enforcement officers, 
who should better understand the current legal framework for these 
circumstances. (Patchin, 2014) 
Notably, another advised schools to be aware about the sensitive responses that 
may come from searching cell phones. 
Disputes related to a person’s right to privacy, actual or perceived, can provoke 
strong feelings and lead to bitter debate. Searching a student and/or his or her 
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cellphone has the potential of inflaming the protective instincts of a parent or 
guardian when the search is perceived as an unnecessary violation of their 
child’s rights or a threat to their child’s physical or mental well-being 
(Harkness) 
One article discussed schools where possession of cell phones is prohibited. 
Where these policies are in place, it seems schools are treating them as contraband, even 
likening the devices to items that students may not legally possess. Nevertheless, still 
recognized that state laws may limit the scope of searches in each state.  “Anything 
illegal or banned by school policy, be it a gun, illegal drugs or alcohol, or a banned cell 
phone, can be confiscated and searched. Nonetheless, state laws may place added 
restrictions on the searches.” (National Youth Rights Organization). Meanwhile, a 
similar article focuses on the intent of the search. It would advise that in schools where 
simple possession of a phone is a violation, no search may be indicated, unless there is 
evidence of more specific wrongdoing. 
Reasonableness is predicated on clearly explicated school rules and policies. For 
example, if a school policy exists that precludes possession of cell phones and a 
student is found with a cell phone, the student has violated school policy. A 
search of the cell phone, however, would only be permissible if school officials 
reasonably believe the student has engaged in additional wrongdoing (like 
cyberbullying or sexting). (Virginia Office of the Attorney General) 
The final text for analysis discussed the ambiguous position that schools are 
currently in given the lack of judicial guidance on school searches of cell phones. It 
called on state legislatures and other statewide policy setting bodies to provide direction 
as schools seek to set policies balancing their need for safety and security with the 
rights of students.  
As devices and disagreements surrounding them become increasingly common, 
we hope that more states will consider seriously when device searches are 
warranted, and adopt guidelines that offer clarity to school officials and students 
while protecting privacy. Until then, administrators, teachers, students, and 
94 
parents should all learn their schools' policies — and, if needed, update them for 
the digital age. (Johnson, A., 2018) 
These media depictions tended to be from a neutral voice on their face, but 
many came from sources with some bias based on the groups they represented. This 
included the American Civil Liberties Union affiliates, groups advising school boards or 
administrators, as well as legal groups seeking to share information. 
Social Media Twitter Content 
In all, 71 tweets met the research criteria. Given that a majority of these texts 
were from student perspectives, it was not unexpected to find that these overwhelming 
spoke of protections against searches of student cell phones. (see Appendix B). Among 
the messages in which students expressed lessened or no privacy in their phones at 
school, the perspective seemed that these students felt resigned to a fate with which they 
disagreed rather than believing they should have limited privacy in their devices at 
school. 
Most parent and other adult voices spoke within themes advocating reduced 
privacy rights for students and minors. There were those that advocated reduced privacy 
to combat conduct issues such as bullying, “Privacy is an adult issue. If under 18s don't 
want their phones checked at school, leave them at home. Bullying needs to stop”. 
Other adult perspectives declined to impart any privacy rights to students in their cell 
phones, “one thing they've talked about in my area is if a student has a smart phone and 
go to school they forfeit all privacy to its data”. On the other hand, there were adult 
voices that spoke about protecting the rights of students generally and, in the case of 
parents, their children, specifically. Notably, one adult teacher voice stated, “I DON'T 
GO THROUGH PHONES! Went to school to be A TEACHER NOT A FORENSIC 
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SCIENTIST... I will STOP dealing with you if I'm VIOLATING PRIVACY.” (Stewart, 
2015). 
Student voices often spoke of techniques and devices to prevent teachers and 
others from being able to view the content as they used their devices. Some specifically 
spoke to the ambiguity of an institution that seeks to teach future citizens about their 
Constitutional rights and then proceed to search student cell phones without reasonable 
suspicion, 
Searching people's phones without explicit permission and giving punishments 
to people without real tangible evidence is NOT the way to stop cheating! In 
your school you teach us students to respect people's privacy, but you don't 
uphold your own philosophy! (dead, 2018) 
Others student voices purported that schools should have no right to search 
phones under any circumstance. “In my opinion the schools should not be able to touch 
a kid’s phone. They didn't buy not do they pay the bill on it. Major privacy violation.” 
Policies 
There are challenges to analyzing school board policies on search and seizure. 
With over 98,000 public schools in the United States (U.S. Department of Education, 
2016), there are many differences in the availability of their policy documents. Whether 
they are required to publish the policies is something that differs from state to state. 
After analyzing hundreds of policies that fit my criteria online, and further refining the 
list to evaluate only those policies that specifically speak to the search of cell phones 
rather than simply addressing personal property or contraband, the policies fell into two 
categories. First, there were those policies that were customized for a particular district. 
After for controlling for all excluded texts I analyzed 10 unique policies and variations. 
(see Appendix D). 
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The second group of policies were those provided to districts through policy 
subscription services. These services are contracted services from state affiliates of the 
National School Boards Association. Levels of service vary by state and by district. For 
some, these policies are individually customized for a particular school district with 
consultation between the district and attorneys prior to formal adoption by the school 
board. Others simply adopt sample policies as written. There are some variations of 
these policies based on specific state laws, and some districts choose to modify the 
policies without legal input. Furthermore, maintenance of the contract affects the 
uniformity of these policies. Some districts routinely review their policy manuals to 
ensure they maintain compliant with all changes in law. However, some do not review 
policies on a schedule, nor do they maintain their policy subscription services. In these 
situations, there may be two districts in the same state that have policies based on the 
same subscription service, with the same coding, but very different content based on the 
date of the policy’s adoption. 
 For thousands of school policy manuals across the country, these policies as 
they relate to searches of student cell phones are coded as either policy JICJ or 5145.12. 
I see this as another area for potential research. Whereas these districts may have, at one 
time, subscribed to a policy service to ensure their legal compliance, their adherence to 
these policies and procedures without a fiduciary commitment to maintain and update 
them on an ongoing basis has the potential to put them at legal risk at some time in the 
future. 
I noted that one California school district had not updated policy 5145.12 since 
2008. While the coding is the same as the current California School Boards 
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Association’s current sample policy on student searches, the content is manifestly 
different. The 2008 policy predates Redding v. Safford, recent privacy protection 
legislation in California, and fails to contemplate numerous technological advances 
made readily available in student cell phones in the last ten years. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
In the past five years, state legislatures have passed no less than 100 laws 
regulating how schools and service providers collect, use, protect, and transmit the 
private data of public school students in this country. (Vance, 2018). Federal laws speak 
to the privacy of student data, but not one outlines the privacy protections afforded 
students in the devices that contain or link to that data. This focus on data rather than 
devices gives little direction to school policy makers. Whether slow or reluctant to act 
on rapidly advancing technology, with few exceptions, state and federal lawmaking 
bodies rely upon the Fourth Amendment to shoulder the burden. 
However, as the federal cases identified in this research illustrate, our courts 
have yet to interpret the application of the Fourth Amendment to student cell phones at 
schools with sufficient depth and uniformity to inform policymakers concerning a 
consistent, universally applicable expectation of privacy for student cell phones. Not 
only do the decisions in these cases give erratic guidance, almost all of them fail to fully 
contemplate the very strong, emotional expectations of privacy that many students 
evidence in their cell phones through social media.  
It is clear that parents’, teachers’, policymakers’ and other adults’ views reflect 
this lack of guidance and ambiguity. Established school policies, as well as the 
published perceptions of various adults in mainstream media and social media show that 
adults see student rights on a scale from near absolute to essentially absent when it 
comes to searching devices on school campuses. These disconnects will likely continue 
until the Supreme Court rules on a case of this nature, or until a predominance of the 
federal appellate circuits issue rulings in cases on point. 
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The federal cases reported that deal with student privacy rights related to cell 
phones are a bit all over the map. While one court stressed that Fourth Amendment 
rights are different in the school context, another suggests that once the device is used in 
violation of law or school rules and becomes contraband, the expectation of privacy 
diminishes even further. 
Another court established that students hold a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in private information contained in a cell phone in language ringing somewhat similar 
to the sentiment of the Supreme Court in Riley v. California (2014), one court felt that 
T.L.O. already contemplated highly personal items brought to school. Another seems 
willing to uphold cell phone searches when the scope is narrowly aligned with very 
specific allegations of wrongdoing. However, none of these courts have thoroughly 
contemplated the privacy implications of content inadvertently accessed while on a 
narrow fishing expedition. In laymen’s terms, how can you authorize someone to look 
into Pandora’s jar and see only a single evil? 
Other cases don’t even discuss students’ expectations of privacy. In fact, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the only federal appellate court to rule on a cell phone 
case, never discussed the student’s expectation of privacy. Its fact-based approach 
would seem that the electronic revolution that has transformed American society in the 
years that followed T.L.O. in no way diminished the Supreme Court’s standards for 
student searches, regardless of Riley. 
Overwhelmingly, the social science conducted to date focuses on digital content 
and not the physical conduits that students carry upon their person every day. To liken 
the situation to literature, the current body of research explores almost every aspect of 
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Narnia without ever considering the role of the wardrobe. Unlike public computers or 
other shared devices, mobile phone owners set up their devices to provide rapid access 
to their data and the applications they use to retrieve and exchange data. They do not 
log-in to their phone contacts or history, nor to their text, email, and instant messaging 
accounts. Often their bank account access, food ordering, and social media applications 
are set up so that the phone is a preferred and remembered secure device, bypassing 
security features. Photographs, calendars, and map histories typically have no security 
features on phones. Ironically, one single physical item serves as a gateway to near 
limitless digital content. Yet, virtually no research has been conducted to determine 
what students think about the privacy of this conduit that serves as a single point of 
entry to numerous details of their private lives. 
And still, the tension remains. Schools balance the remnants of the common 
law’s right to act in loco parentis, or in a role much like that with the rights and 
responsibilities of a parent, with the modern educational system’s duty to protect 
students. However, the same duty to protect students from the harms that can come 
from the ill use of cell phones or the misdeeds evidenced in their digital contents, is the 
same duty that compels school employees to protect students from unreasonable 
searches and related violations of individual rights. 
Until the Supreme Court considers a case related to a cell phone search at a 
public school, or the federal courts shift their tenor, the digital frontier has done little to 
change policy implications for public schools. The tests for legality of searches of 
students set forth in T.L.O. and subsequent cases remain the gold standard in the era of 
the smart phone. School leaders would be wise to ensure that their policies align with 
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the standards set forth in T.L.O., and do not have general language that essentially 
waives all students’ Fourth Amendment rights in their phones. Further, it would be 
prudent to be constantly vigilant about the potential for new and changing state laws 
that may impact a school’s authority to conduct cell phone searches in their jurisdiction. 
In the meantime, it seems that, through media and social media depictions that 
there are vastly different views among students and among adults about what rights 
students have related to the search of cell phones in the public-school setting. Not only 
does this disconnect have the potential for creating future legal controversy, this 
presents an opportunity to inform students, parents, and the public about the actual 
policies and procedures within an individual school district to ensure all stakeholders 
are operating from a common expectation.  
While educative initiatives designed to teach students about digital citizenship 
are growing in popularity, it would be wise to ensure that content is also designed to 
help students and parents better understand their rights related to their actual devices in 
practical ways and practices they can employ to protect themselves and the information 
and access points contained therein, as well as how what use on school property may 
potentially make them subject to search or inadvertently subject to forms of electronic 
surveillance. With the proliferation of access to digital devices, this content should be 
considered as a mandatory part of curriculum related to citizenship and ethical behavior 
from the earliest grades on.  Further, it would be wise for state-level policymakers to 
work to create some uniformity through policy and guidance and suggested curriculum 
throughout the schools in their respective states. 
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This research is in no way exhaustive on the topic of student privacy rights in 
cell phones at public schools, but shows this area to be ripe for future research on many 
levels. A lack of clear direction from the courts, the absence of meaningful social 
scientific data, and limited legislative action leave schools and school leaders in the 
position of enacting and enforcing policy relying on information that is ambiguous and 
open to mixed interpretation. This investigation evidences a need for quality social 
science research to inform courts and policymakers about the actual privacy beliefs of 
modern public-school students and how these beliefs may potentially inform future 
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Appendix B: DiscoverText Tweet Statistics: Privacy Expectation 
 
 
General Stats (Filters don't apply to general stats)
Coder Stats
Total Coding Time: 00:22:26 
Avg. Coding Time: 9s 
Dataset Name: Tweets (Project: Research)
display download options
Number of codes: 6 Number of coders: 1
Units in dataset: 71
Total number of units to
code:
71
Number of units coded: 71 (100.00%)
Total number of units
coded:
71 (100.00%)
Coder Units Coded Avg. Coding Time Total Coding Time
t b 71(100.00%) 9.48s 00:11:13
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Appendix C: DiscoverText Tweet Statistics: Voice 
 
 
General Stats (Filters don't apply to general stats)
Coder Stats
Total Coding Time: 00:22:26 
Avg. Coding Time: 9s 
Dataset Name: Tweets (Project: Research)
display download options
Number of codes: 6 Number of coders: 1
Units in dataset: 71
Total number of units to
code:
71
Number of units coded: 71 (100.00%)
Total number of units
coded:
71 (100.00%)
Coder Units Coded Avg. Coding Time Total Coding Time
t b 71(100.00%) 9.48s 00:11:13
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Portion of Policy Aligning with Research Questions Level of Privacy Protection 
Code
1 Students shall have no expectation of confidentiality with respect to their use 
of PCDs (includes phones) on school premises/property.... School officials 
will not search or otherwise tamper with PCDs in District custody unless 
they reasonably suspect that the search is required to discover evidence of 
a violation of the law or other school rules. Any search will be conducted in 
accordance with Policy 5771 – Search and Seizure.
3, No expectation of con-
fidentiality with respect to 
use of cell phones on school 
property
2 Students retain an expectation of privacy in their cell phones and electronic 
devices. As the Supreme Court has recognized, students do not shed their 
constitutional rights when they go to school.
A school official may search an individual student’s cell phone or electronic 
device only when she has a reasonable and individualized focused on the 
individual student—suspicion that the search will reveal evidence that the 
student violated a school district policy pertaining to the conduct of students, 
as published and made available by the school pursuant to G.L. chapter 
71, §37H. Simple possession or use of a cell phone or electronic device in 
violation of a school rule is insufficient justification for a search of the device. 
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and objective facts that 
the search will produce evidence related to the particular alleged violation. 
Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on curiosity, rumor, hunch, mere 
disruptive activity, attempts to hide personal possessions, or invocations of a 
student’s constitutional rights. Searches of an individual student’s cell phone 
or electronic device may not be conducted in order to search for evidence of 
another student’s or students’ violations. Prior to conducting any search of a 
student’s personal device, school staff shall: (1) document the individualized 
facts that constitute the reasonable suspicion justifying the search; (2) notify 
the student and the student’s parent or legal guardian of the particular
suspected violation and the type of data to be searched for as evidence 
of the violation; and (3) provide the student’s parent or legal guardian the 
opportunity to be present during the search. The search must be limited in 
scope to locating evidence of the suspected policy violation and must be 
terminated when any such evidence has been located. It shall be a violation 
of this policy to copy, share, or in any way transmit any information from a 
student’s cell phone or electronic device unless that action is directly relat-
ed to the stated justification for the search and is necessary for the proper 
handling of any related disciplinary proceeding.
1
Code Key: 1) Search policies that refer to language authorizing searches based on T.L.O. analysis, 2) Policies in which 










Portion of Policy Aligning with Research Questions Level of Privacy Protection 
Code
3 Unauthorized use of cell phones will result in confiscation and/or search of 
the cell phone as such action is a direct violation of school policy.
* Cell phones, like all other personal items brought by a student into a school
building, may be subject to search. The outcome of that search may result in
school sanction and/or a criminal investigation by the police.
2
4 Pictures or recordings taken on campus or at school events will not be post-
ed on the Internet or shared without written permission of the Administration. 
The District is not liable for any inappropriate actions, content, or materials 
accessed or shared on personal devices (see BP 6163.5 and AR 6.7). If 
there is reasonable suspicion, administration reserves the right to hold onto 
the device and search content on any personal device, including but not 
limited to blogs, text messages, images, etc., during an investigation.
3, Cites reasonable suspi-
cion, but fails to  follow the 
guidelines in T.L.O
5 The contents of a cellular phone, camera, or other device may be searched 
to determine ownership, to identify emergency contacts, or upon reasonable 
suspicion that a school or District rule or the law has been violated.
3, Cites reasonable suspi-
cion, but fails to  follow the 
guidelines in T.L.O
6 If the School District has reasonable suspicion to believe that students have 
used a cell phone, or other electronic device to cheat, plagiarize, violate a 
copyright or commit any other act that is in violation of the Student Conduct 
Policy, then the School District shall have the right to search the device to 
the maximum extent permitted by law for evidence of such activity. If it is 
determined that the use of the device violated more than one policy, then 
they may be disciplined under each policy.
1
7 School administrator or designee may search digital media devices based on 
reasonable suspicion that they contain evidence of a violation of school rules 
or policy.
3, Appears to follow T.L.O., 
but fails to ensure the 
search is narrowly tailored to 
the supsected violation.
8 Students have no right of privacy as to the content contained on any elec-
tronic devices that have been confiscated. 3 A search of a confiscated device 
shall meet the reasonable individualized suspicion requirements of Policy 
4.32—SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND INTERROGATIONS.
3, Meets T.L.O.’s reasonable 
individualized suspicion ele-
ment, but fails to incorporate 
its additional protections.
Code Key: 1) Search policies that refer to language authorizing searches based on T.L.O. analysis, 2) Policies in which 








Portion of Policy Aligning with Research Questions Level of Privacy Protection 
Code
3 Unauthorized use of cell phones will result in confiscation and/or search of 
the cell phone as such action is a direct violation of school policy.
* Cell phones, like all other personal items brought by a student into a school 
building, may be subject to search. The outcome of that search may result in 
school sanction and/or a criminal investigation by the police.
2
4 Pictures or recordings taken on campus or at school events will not be post-
ed on the Internet or shared without written permission of the Administration. 
The District is not liable for any inappropriate actions, content, or materials 
accessed or shared on personal devices (see BP 6163.5 and AR 6.7). If 
there is reasonable suspicion, administration reserves the right to hold onto 
the device and search content on any personal device, including but not 
limited to blogs, text messages, images, etc., during an investigation.
3, Cites reasonable suspi-
cion, but fails to  follow the 
guidelines in T.L.O
5 The contents of a cellular phone, camera, or other device may be searched 
to determine ownership, to identify emergency contacts, or upon reasonable 
suspicion that a school or District rule or the law has been violated.
3, Cites reasonable suspi-
cion, but fails to  follow the 
guidelines in T.L.O
6 If the School District has reasonable suspicion to believe that students have 
used a cell phone, or other electronic device to cheat, plagiarize, violate a 
copyright or commit any other act that is in violation of the Student Conduct 
Policy, then the School District shall have the right to search the device to 
the maximum extent permitted by law for evidence of such activity. If it is 
determined that the use of the device violated more than one policy, then 
they may be disciplined under each policy.
1
7 School administrator or designee may search digital media devices based on 
reasonable suspicion that they contain evidence of a violation of school rules 
or policy.
3, Appears to follow T.L.O., 
but fails to ensure the 
search is narrowly tailored to 
the supsected violation.
8 Students have no right of privacy as to the content contained on any elec-
tronic devices that have been confiscated. 3 A search of a confiscated device 
shall meet the reasonable individualized suspicion requirements of Policy 
4.32—SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND INTERROGATIONS.
3, Meets T.L.O.’s reasonable 
individualized suspicion ele-





Portion of Policy Aligning with Research Questions Level of Privacy Protection 
Code
9 The types of student property that may be searched by school officials 
include, but are not limited to, lockers, desks, purses, backpacks, student 
vehicles parked on district property, cellular phones, or other electronic 
communication devices. Any search of a student, his/her property, or district 
property under his/her control shall be limited in scope and designed to 
produce evidence related to the alleged violation. Factors to be considered 
by school officials when determining the scope of the search shall include 
the danger to the health or safetyof students or staff, such as the possession 
of weapons, drugs, or other dangerous instruments, and whether the item(s) 
to be searched by school officials are reasonably related to the contraband 
to be found.In addition, school officials shall consider the intrusiveness of 
the search in light of the student’s age, gender, and the nature of the alleged 
violation.
1
10 Possession of a personal electronic device on school property acknowledges 
consent to search the contents of the device in a school or criminal investi-
gation. In such investigations, students will provide necessary login informa-
tion as needed.
2
Code Key: 1) Search policies that refer to language authorizing searches based on T.L.O. analysis, 2) Policies in which 
students are forewarned that their possession of cell phones at school served as the equivalent of a consent to their search, 
and 3) Other.
